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Abstract.
The essay explores topics related to the objectivity and
rationality of aesthetics. Initially, the nature of objectivity is 
considered. The question is raised: what is it for something to be
objective?. Various metaphysical objections to the view that value
is an objective feature of the world are considered, These include 
the idea that what truly exists is coincident with that which is 
subject-independent; that will and. cognition are distinct 
autonomous mental faculties; that value is, eplstemologically, a 
'queer' commodity the experience of which is qualitatively distinct 
from sense-experlence. Thereafter, aesthetic concepts are
investigated more closely. The idea that the meaning of an 
expression is secured by a definition is challenged. It is argued 
that the practical impossibility of defining aesthetic terms does 
not preclude their having a precise meaning in discussion. In 
particular, the view that understanding is a mental process
involving the grasp of something like a definition is criticized.
The idea that the sense of a concept is, like the notes of music, 
influenced by its whole context is introduced. Aesthetic concepts, 
it is argued, are governed by conditions no less than concepts such
as 'intelligent', 'resourceful', and the like. Finally, the view_
that aesthetic value, being a disposition of the will, is <■
cognitively ungoverned is investigated, It. is concluded that in so 
far as the disposition of the will is sensitive to, i. e. , can be. 
modified by, means that deserve, in virtue of their wide currency, 
to be counted rational the will is cognitively constrained.
1.
Introduction,
This essay explores what grounds there are for attributing 
rationality to aesthetic activity. There may be no demonstrative 
proofs in aesthetics - it may not be possible to prove Beethoven 
greater than Bach in the way in which it is possible to prove the 
value of Avogadro's number - but that is not to say that that 
discussions of aesthetic merit and demerit are spurious or 
arbitrary. If instances of rationality were confined to
mathematics and the physical sciences there would be precious 
little rationality in ordinary life.
A number of metaphors occur to me which express both what I 
hope to achieve and the procedure by means of which I hope io 
achieve it. The first presents a picture of aesthetics isolated, 
sinking in heavy seas, throwing out hooks and mooring ropes to 
various other activities. Thus if aesthetics goes down under a 
philosophical attack so too does this and that area of rational 
activity. Another metaphor is also one which pictures aesthetics 
'coming in from the cold': aesthetics again Isolated, like a single 
sheep, and vulnerable to attack; but brought in to the fold of 
rational activities, there to survive or perish with the rest. In 
other words, I hope to so to speak 'spread the risk', demonstrating 
that aesthetics is not singular in its vulnerability to certain 
lines of thought. I hope the effect of this will be to make the 
sceptic think twice about the worth of his arguments - for almost
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certainly these arguments will cast a doubt more far-reaching than 
ought to be countenanced with equanimity'.
The aim of this essay, then, is to show aesthetic 
discussion/activity to be a relative of other rational pursuits, 
founded upon no more or less than other rational activities, woven 
so to speak into the fabric of rationality itself,
A number of views, more or less well-defined and explicit, 
conspire to create a climate which is, if not openly hostile to 
aesthetics, unsympathetic: it is a climate that makes the subject
easy to dismiss or ignore. And, clearly, bringing aesthetics into 
the fold in the way that I describe requires that theories which 
seek to isolate it ought to be scrutinized most closely. One view 
in particular leads to the marginalization of aesthetics, namely, 
the idea of the needle-thin aesthetic agent. Under this rubric may 
be listed a number of iniquitous views. The needle-thin agent is 
the agent whose acts (typically judgements, or judgement-expressing 
actions) are self-contained, isolated from other interests...The 
aesthetic agent is often characterized thus, as though the act of 
judgement were an insular happening, quite without context or 
supporting considerations. On such a view it is difficult to see 
where the aesthetic judgements gets its light from, i.e., what 
informs it, supports it, counts for or against it, etc.
One argument to which I am drawn, and which figures in this 
essay, is the view that an aesthetic judgement, if it is well-
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considered, reflects the state of the will generally, or that the 
state of the will as a whole finds expression in the well- 
considered judgement. Thus the judgement has the support of the 
whole motivational structure of the person: it is in line with all 
his other judgements, and bears a logical relation to them. To 
say, then, that a particular judgement cannot be rationally 
defended is to say that no such judgement can be rationally 
defended, and that the disposition of the will as a whole cannot be 
counted a part of, or an expression of, rationality. For it will 
be argued that all judgements, all dispositions of the will, rest 
upon a non-rational foundation. Thus, however much the judgements 
of a person form a logically coherent whole the particular 
judgements are still spurious in virtue of the fact that the whole 
is spurious - just as nothing on the earth is stationary if the 
earth is moving through space.
The structure of the assay may be outlined as follows.
The first chapter deals with the metaphysics of aesthetic 
value, and tackles the question whether aesthetic values exist and 
if so how they might be located in a general philosophical picture. 
The second chapter continues on the metaphysical theme, before 
moving on to a more particular discussion of aesthetic terms, 
aesthetic argument, the role of emotion in aesthetic appraisal, and 
so forth. The third chapter explores the idea that the value of 
aesthetic experience is related to the overall value that a person 
places on activities in life, i.e., that aesthetic judgements are
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not the product of an isolated faculty or curiously detached way of 
seeing, but that they are an outgrowth of the rationality of the 
individual.
The first section of the first chapter questions the 
assumption that what really exists is what is objective in the 
sense that it is not dependent upon any particular point of view. 
The identification of the real with the non-local imperils value 
because value may be analysed as a disposition of the human will. 
Access may only be gained to value through the specifically human 
point of view,
The second section of the first chapter looks at a theory of 
man that is ancillary to this objectivist/absolutlst metaphysics. 
The compartmentalization of the human psyche that is a common 
feature of this view is criticised.
Then, in the third section, a further support of this view is
criticized, namely the idea that knowledge is accumulated through
abstractions and generalizations from atomic sensations. Value, 
not being an atomic sensation, finds difficulty in squeezing into 
this picture. I suggest that the concepts that mark our basic 
sensations - 'red', 'sour', 'hot' - are not derived from raw sense- 
experience, and that they are applied to the world according to
rules that derive from a human practice, rules which cannot be
accessed from a point outwith the practice. And I suggest that the 
•newly-humbled' concepts of sensation are now on the same plane as
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aesthetic concepts. ('Newly-humbled' referring here to the fact 
that these concepts have been knocked from their priveledged 
position in the empiricist epistemology.)
The second chapter is an attempt to investigate this last 
idea more fully. The problem that kicks off the second chapter is 
how, even if we are unsatisfied with a metaphysics that excludes 
value, we can find a place for value when we do not know what it 
is, cannot define it, cannot say what secures the meaning of an 
aesthetic concept. The idea that definitions are necessary to, or 
indicative of, rationality is considered, and the theory of 
understanding that underpins the demand for definitions is 
criticised. Following on from this the resemblance between 
concepts such as 'red' and aesthetic concepts is inspected from a 
little more close to. The way in which a concept that eludes easy 
definition may be employed along with other concepts in order to 
pick out very fine features of the world is discussed.
The second chapter seeks also to demonstrate that aesthetic 
concepts are subject to conditions. Just as it is not possible to 
call anything red it is not possible to call anything elegant. 
However, the idea emerges that 'elegant', unlike 'red', is value- 
loaded. It expresses, along with a description of an object, a 
certain disposition of the will towards the object. The way in 
which an object may be described may be governed by conditions but, 
so the argument goes, the disposition of the will is not. From a 
factual description any evaluation may follow. In the third
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chapter I argue that this picture forces a questionable distinction 
between fact and value: it is not clear that an account of the
facts is accessible independently of particular evaluations. Thus 
the idea of a substratum of fact over which value moves 
unconstrained is a misrepresentation of the true state of affairs.
Finally, the essay threads a path through hostile territory. 
The aim throughout is to proceed from one point to the next by the 
most direct route. This may result in a certain terseness, even a 
certain sketchiness. I believe, however, that the major obstacles
will be considered. The essay attempts outline a stance on the
issues, and to demonstrate that such a stance is at least feasible.
7 .
Chapter One.
This chapter takes the form of a three-pronged attack upon a 
version of non-cognitivlsm. tfo particular formulation of non- 
cognltivism is considered, but an 'identikit' version is assembled 
for Investigation. The identikit version is characterized as the 
composite of three inter-related views, These are, first, the view 
that the world as it is in itself does not contain value; second, 
the view that the human psyche may usefully be divided' into 
autonomous faculties - this division paralleling a metaphysical 
distinction between fact and value; third, the view that knowledge 
is derived from basic, simple atoms of sensation. On each of these 
issues the present chapter takes an antagonistic stance.
As I say, a number of conceptual relations may be discerned 
between these ideas. In some contexts they give one another 
logical support. In other contexts they amount to little more than 
different expressions of one metaphysical view. Thus, the tendency 
to compartmentalize the human mind (into the faculties of reason 
and desire, or cognition and will) complements the inclination to 
press home certain metaphysical distinctions, in particular that 
between fact and value. In other words the one is the counterpart 
- in a different dimension, to be sure - of the other (see, for 
example, John McDowell's assertion to this effect in Is Morality a 
System of Hypothetical Imperatives? PÂSSV. 1978). Or, again, the 
atomistic epistemology considered in the latter part of the chapter 
is ancillary to the metaphysics considered in the earlier part^.
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Even a cursory glance at the main features of the non- 
cognitivist account of aesthetic value is sufficient to reveal why 
these areas in particular require attention. Aesthetic value, it 
is argued, is not objective (in one sense of the term) since it is 
dependent upon the reactions of the human organism: value can be
analysed as the disposition of an organism (consider Colin 
McGinn's formulation; "[A] dispositional thesis about value 
properties will hold that (e.g.) being good consists in a 
propensity on the part of good things to elicit in observers 
reactions of moral approval," iThe Subjective Ffew, p.147.)). This 
is hardly contestable- But coupled with the view that only what is 
objective in the sense that it is independent of a subject is real, 
value may appear to reside in the world only as a result of the 
mind's tendency to spread itself upon objects of attention. And 
this propensity to spread is not governed or licensed by the world 
as it is in itself. Therefore, value may only appear objective as 
the result of a kind of illusion, an error of judgement. The 
tendency to value is not licensed by any aspect of the world, and 
aesthetic distinctions do not pick out any feature of the world. 
This view is corroborated, supposedly, by the fact that value is an 
epistemologically fugitive quality, i.e., it seems logically 
complex and does not appear as a raw datum to any of the five 
senses®. Why do these views amount to a version of non- 
cognltlvism? Roughly, the first says that value does not exist to 
be known. The second aligns value with will and, bringing about a 
separation of will from cognition, says that value is not properly
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an object of cognition. The third view is supposed to account for 
why value is not easily enlisted amongst the items of cognition.
The important arguments, very briefly, are these, [1] If 
value is said not really to exist in the world - and this largely 
because it is tied to the human perception of things - then two 
consequences may be made out. The first is that on these grounds 
much must be jettisoned from the picture of reality along with 
value. And the question arises: Is this palatable? Is it
coherent? Second, the enterprise of disclosing the real by moving 
farther and farther from the particular point of view of the 
individual man or the individual llfe-form threatens to yield a 
specious notion of objectivity, the metaphysical equivalent, it 
might be said, of the empty set. If what is real is what exists 
independently of specifically human representations then it is 
difficult to see how we can ever arrive at a properly-purged 
conception of the real. There is, also, an argument to the effect 
that an objective conception of the world neglects, necessarily, 
certain subjective aspects of the world. C23 If value is conceived 
as a misidentification of subjective impulses - i.e., desires - 
then an adequate account of desire is required in order that the 
major features of aesthetic activity may be rendered intelligible. 
This is not forthcoming if it is assumed that desire, or will, is 
non-cognitive. [33 Then there are familiar arguments against the 
view that knowledge is gained as the result of a process of 
generalization from atomic and unanalysable sensation. Perception, 
it may be argued, is conceptually-informed seeing. If the concepts
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that we use to represent the world are not self-evident they must 
be founded upon something else, something other than sensation 
pure-and-simple. And if that is the case it is possible that 
aesthetic concepts may be grounded in the same manner, and so mark 
out distinctions in the world no less than concepts such as 'red' 
and 'sour' and the like. (There may be a difference in complexity 
but not a difference in kind.)
It is worth noting, finally, that the epistemological 
considerations that feature in the third section serve as the 
principal point upon which the discussion pivots from the 
considerations that occupy the first chapter to those that occupy 
the second. For the challenge to an empiricist epistemology 
contained in the third section brings to light the possibility that 
concepts such as those found in aesthetic discussions on the one 
hand (e.g., 'elegant', 'imposing', 'ironic') and concepts such as 
'red' and 'sour' on the other, between which empiricism seeks to 
draw a firm distinction, derive their meaning from the same source, 
or are legitimized in the same way. That is to say that they both 
bear the same relation to 'raw' experience, and are applied in the 
same way, namely, in accordance with the established procedures of 
a community (rather than a system of rules secured by a happy and 
fortuitous agreement in private exemplars). And if this idea goes 
through then it is possible to see how aesthetic concepts may be 
brought into line with concepts of other kinds, from 'red' and 
'sour' to 'intelligent' and 'innovative'. And it will be possible 
to give an account of what is at issue in aesthetic matters. And
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it is precisely this difficulty - what aesthetic concepts mean, or 
refer to - that kicks off the second chapter. Thus the first 
chapter serves to open up a conceptual space and the second chapter 
seeks to fill it in a little.
I should like to begin with some scraps of common wisdom 
against which I shall be concerned to argue in this essay. It is 
not, however (and unfortunately), just scraps of common wisdom that 
shall be found in need of criticism. For standing in support of - 
or representing a more sophisticated expression of - the views 
against which I shall be arguing is a philosophical theory of 
considerable weight and proportions. So I shall be arguing against 
this theory as well.
The scraps of wisdom I have in mind are such as these: that 
beauty is in the eye of the beholder; that there is no accounting 
for taste; that art 'works’ - i.e., achieves an effect - 'for you'; 
that the 'aesthetic agent' - the agent whose agency consists in 
making an aesthetic Judgement - is, so to speak, needle-thin; that 
no-one ever really disputes about values; and so on. Two main 
points need to be made here. The first is that these views are not 
always distinct. Various conceptual connections may be made out 
between them. For example, the idea that there is no accounting 
for taste, i.e., the idea that it is not possible to justify an
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aesthetic judgement (which is the idea that there is no such thing 
as aesthetic knowledge') ^ gains support from the view that the 
aesthetic agent is, in Wittgenstein's phrase, 'an axtensionless 
point'; he is not substantial enough to get to grips with, and his 
characteristic action, the aesthetic judgement, as it were flashes 
into the world like lightning and disturbs nothing elçe^. On this 
view a man might be a beast and a boor in all things but one, which 
is that he writes music like Mozart®. The other point that needs 
to be made is that these views are presented here in a rough form 
initially. Ambiguities surround the concepts as I have introduced 
them. So at least part of what follows will be an attempt to 
sharpen the definition of these ideas, to say what lies behind 
them, and to investigate the coherence of any theory that may 
emerge in the process.
Having said that, this much, at any rate, may be observed 
with confidence (though it does not go very far); the common views 
variously express doubts about the objectivity of aesthetic value. 
They express doubts, that is, about whether aesthetic terms pick 
out features of the world, whether there is truth to be had in 
aesthetic matters, and how aesthetic knowledge is to be come by, 
When for example it is said that art either works for you or it 
doesn't, the implication is that art may be successful or not on a 
capricious individual basis (rather than successful or unsuccessful 
full stop). Expressions to do with the possibility - or 
impossibility - of aesthetic argument and justification emphasize 
the incorrigibility of the individual response. The individual
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response is the criterion of the existence of an aesthetic quality 
(as it is the criterion of, say, the existence of a particular 
mental image). And the doubts about the contestability of 
judgement effectively cordon off the aesthetic response from 
rationality at large; the two pass one another by. These, then, 
are not statements of faith in the objectivity, justifiability, or 
rationality of aesthetic judgement.
What, on the face of it, might give rise to such scepticism?
One thought, familiar from moral philosophy, takes its' cue from the 
sheer volume of discussion and divergent opinion that the phenomena 
of art generate. This huge variety of interest suggests that 
artistic values are essentially contestable. Fo two people neem to 
share exactly the same tastes, And where objective enquiries like 
science show ;i united front and a common purpose, aesthetic 
enquiries present an unruly rabble. Aesthetic matters, therefore, 
must (it is claimed) be subjective and incapable of definitive 
solution. Only this could explain the fact that art supports 
without obvious contradiction such a multiplicity of antagonistic 
views. Yet it must be said that this diversity of opinion is not 
so great as might appear. Even Hume was led to observe that some 
judgements of aesthetic value amount to endorsing a 'palpable 
absurdity' - as though asserting the Atlantic to be no more than a
puddle or a molehill to be equal to a Tenerife. And that there is II
some acQunting to be done where taste is concerned is attested to j
by the very ample bodies of scholarship surrounding art-phenomena^. jI
And again, that beauty is not in the eye of the beholder in the i
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same way that deliciousness is in the tongue of the taster is 
attested to by the human compulsion to discuss at length the one 
and not the other^. For unless we are in the grip of a 
philosophical theory we shall often argue the merits of this music 
over that or of this film over that with as much conviction as any 
matter of fact. Another sceptical thought takes its rise from the 
fact that it is difficult to see what really clinches an aesthetic 
dispute; justifications seem to give out rather easily in 
aesthetics. That is to say that arguments about beauty (and like 
concepts) lead, rather quickly, to an impasse. There comes a point 
where no adequate justification can be given for preferring one 
view (one judgement) over another. Still, the argument is hardly 
conclusive. For, as the success of philosophical scepticism shows, 
many of our beliefs and practices, when pressed, appear to suffer 
from a similar lack of foundation. A complete justification (of 
the sort the sceptic requires) of our matter of fact beliefs is no 
more to be had than a Justification of an aesthetic preference. 
Moreover, it is simply untrue that there are no convincing 
arguments within aesthetic discussions. Sometimes the received 
wisdom of a generation of critics may be entirely overhauled as a 
result of cogent critical argument. And the existence of respected 
critics suggests that these men and women are distinguished by the 
relevance and the quality of their arguments®. One further source 
of scepticism (or is it an expression of scepticism) is the idea 
that aesthetic Judgements really settle nothing. Whether something 
is beautiful or not depends upon whether someone is of the opinion 
that it is beautiful. There is no beauty apart from the experience
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of beauty. To say, therefore, that something is beautiful is not
to pick out a feature of the world. It is not to refer to an
objective - that is publicly available - fact. As Colin McGinn 
puts it; "It is legitimate to enquire. .. whether the world is so 
represented because of the specific constitution of the
representing mind or because the world as it is independently of 
the mind contains a feature which demands representation." (.The 
Subjective Fiew, p.l). The ' mind-dependence' of beauty places it
firmly in the category of subjective representations. The
experience of beauty is not the experience of reality as it is in 
itself. Beauty is not a feature of the world that demands
representation. Beauty, and all of aesthetics, is therefore
unreal, chimerical, mirage-like. Yet the mind-dapendency of beauty 
is shared by secondary qualities in general, by colour and sound 
and smell, etc. Indeed, as scepticism again shows - and science 
shows in its own way - a vast area of experience is dependent upon 
the specific constitution of the human sense-organs and the human 
mind; damage the sense-organs or damage the mind (the brain) and 
you change the perceived nature of reality.
Nevertheless, aesthetic judgement emerges, overall, as a
particularly mysterious activity. The idea that there is nothing 
in the world as it is independently of its representation in 
experience corresponding to an aesthetic term lends support to the 
feeling that aesthetic judgement is in some sense arbitrary. If 
the aesthetic judgement is not a judgement of plain fact it is a 
shot in the dark. There is no telling how a judgement ought to go;
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we can at best say only how a judgement usually goes. (I.e., any 
'ought' that enters Into aesthetics is on this view an 'ought* in 
the the sense of 'it is likely that', which is to say an ought of 
expectation warranted by induction from past experience, rather 
than the 'ought' of rational requirement.) And that nothing in the 
world secures a particular judgement explains, moreover, the level 
of dispute surrounding aesthetic matters. It explains, also, our 
own insensitivities and incapacities. If we doubt whether this 
music is truly sombre or whether it is mock-sombre this is because 
nothing really points the way. There is no mechanical decision- 
procedure. Ve must strain to detect the Infinitesimal stirrings of 
our emotions; each individual must hearken to his own feelings. An 
aesthetic judgement is not so much a statement about the world as a 
statement about an individual; an aesthetic judgement, floating 
free of the real world, is an item of self-revalation, of 
autobiography.
The argument proceeds; If an aesthetic judgement is not to be 
a matter of individual caprice, insulated from rational appraisal, 
and communicable only by means of a sort of persuasion, it must be 
'available' to everyone - everyone must (in principle) be able to 
see what is at issue and, so to speak, have a democratic say in the 
matter. No-one must be disqualified from knowledge of the 
aesthetic fact by reason of individual circumstance and makeup. A 
fact that is available, logically, only from one point of view is 
subject-dependent and therefore not an indication of how reality is 
in itself (as reality is Independently of subjects). The idea of
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an objective fact is precisely the idea of a fact that does not
require, for its recognition, particular capacities, circumstances, 
or conditions of observation®. Such a fact commands universal 
assent because access to it is not restricted by any contingencies 
of experience: it enters in some way into the experience of
everyone. Thus a dispute about an objective fact holds out the
possibility of solution because the fact is by definition open to 
universal view. (It is worth saying here that the objective fact 
is available to everyone and everything - every sentient thing. A
fact that appears to every human would, under this conception of
objectivity, enjoy a quasi-objectivity. True objectivity is an
absolute notion. Objectivity proper does not admit of degrees.)
If there is a doubt in the aesthetic case, then, it concerns
whether and to what extent 'aesthetic facts' are available to
everyone. And so we are drawn into the question of what is 
necessary to a fact if it is to be open to universal view. And the
answer here is that the fact must be objective in the relevant
sense.
The objective account of the world, comprised by objective 
facts, has been described by Thomas Nagel as 'the view from no­
where ' . The view from no-where is a terminus on a continuum 
running from "the point of view of a particular individual, having 
a specific constitution, situation, and relation to the rest of the 
world," to "a conception of the world which as far as possible is 
not the view from anywhere within it" (Mortal Questions, p.206). 
The attainment of objectivity, says Nagel, involves "abstraction
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from the individual’s specific spatial, temporal, and personal 
position in the world, then from the features that distinguish him 
from other humans, then gradually from the forms of perception and 
action characteristic of humans, and away from from the narrow 
range of a human scale in space, time, and quantity" (Ibid). The 
upshot of this is that the objective facts are independent of human 
scale. The objective facts are the residue of this furious work of 
abstraction. They do not require for their representation any of 
the things that can be 'thought out' of a specific subjective view. 
And that means, in the terms of Nagel's formulation, that an 
objective fact cannot depend upon an individual's 'spatial, 
temporal, and personal position in the world', nor can it depend 
upon 'forms of perception and action characteristic of humans', nor 
yet upon the human conceptions of space time, and quantity.
Inevitably, a question arises concerning the character of the 
conception of the world that remains. The question takes the form 
of a dilemma; if an objective account of the world amounts to a 
determinate conception of how things are then the objectivity of 
the account looks to be compromised. For it may just be another 
account from a particular place in the world - an account with 
greater scope, to be sure, but no less anthropocentric for that. 
On the other hand if an objective account of the world does not 
amount to a determinate conception of how things are it begins to 
come adrift from explanation and representation altogether. The 
truly indeterminate conception may not have the resources to pick 
out and deal with any features of the world at all'®. Both
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difficulties are represented in science as we now have it. On the 
one hand there are theories that explain by what might be called 
metaphorical extension. Macro-phenomena (e.g., pressure-volume 
relationships) are accounted for by reference to micro-phenomena 
(elastic collisions between micro-particles) conceived, in turn, on 
the model of further macro-phenomena''. Ve talk, for instance, of 
light- and sound- waves. We try to accomodate the esoteric 
findings of relativity theory in talk of gravity-weiis, space-time 
curves, and event-hori^rons'The point here is two-fold. First, 
the intelligibility of these theories - the feeling that we 'have a 
handle on them' - comes from the fact that we can explain events by 
means of causal interactions familiar to us from everyday 
experience: we have, if you like, a kind of scientific
homuncularism. Second, the organization of theory itself depends 
upon the use of these metaphoric terms; it may make a huge 
difference whether your theory groups light under partiele-theory 
or wave-theory. How you conceive of your theory (the way in which 
you picture the entities of which your theory treats) will very 
likely have a hand in deciding the direction of future research and 
practical application (see, for example, T. Kuhn, The Structure of 
Scientific Révolutions). And our specifically human concerns may 
structure theory by suggesting connections between phenomena that 
we would otherwise have overlooked or undervalued. For example, 
the scientific study of disease will very likely classify phenomena 
(viruses, amino-acids, etc) with an eye to how they influence the 
human constitution - and this will lend the human account a 
particular slant: the rock will split in one direction rather than
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another, so to speak'®. So the position that we occupy in the 
world finds expression in our scientific theories and is 
responsible for the degree to which we find a given explanation 
intelligible. On the other hand there are theories that are not 
conceptually determinate, e.g., relativity- and quantum- theory. 
While these theories are . instrumental1y successful their 
significance is far from obvious. In the absence of a clear and 
authoratitive interpretation of the mathematics involved it is 
reasonable to say that we do not know quite what such theories tell 
us about the w o r l d ' V e  do not know what they mean. They tell 
us, to be sure, to expect such-and-such an outcome to such-and-such 
a sequence of events. But these forecasts, it seems, are little 
better than uncannily accurate predictions issuing from an oracle. 
These are not explanations, for they do not provide a rationale of 
events. These theories, then, fall short of providing a view of 
the world. The intuitive understanding that is lacking would 
constitute such a view; but it would at the same time contaminate 
the scientific account with subjective elements. The initial 
dilemma may be reformulated: we have on the one hand, in the shape
of the more abstract and mathematical of the sciences, a successful
but intuitively opaque method of Inquiry - this yields no 
particular view of the world, forces no determinate interpretation, 
and as a consequence is somewhat thin on significance or meaning; 
and we have on the other hand, in the shape of the less abstract 
sciences, a method of inquiry that, at the price of more or less
anthropocentricity, yields pictures of the world with more or less
scope, determinacy, and precision.
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Another facet of this general problem, which may shed further 
light on the issue, concerns the notion of cause itself. On the 
objective view the only relation that really holds between events 
is the causal relation, Value-relationships, relationships based 
upon perception of secondary qualities, and conceptual
relationships generally are regarded with suspicion. The following 
thesis, from Colin McGinn's The Subjective View, is typical: "It is 
often observed that secondary qualities are explanatorily
idle...these qualities are not ascribed to things as part of the 
enterprise of explaining the causal interactions of objects with 
each other: colour and taste do not contribute to the causal powers 
of things...the interactions between objects proceed independently 
of the experiences of perceivers" (p. 14/15). ITow in the first 
place it is only true to say that secondary qualities are
explanatorily idle if you are thinking - as McGinn obviously is - 
of causal explanation. Explanations may proceed in non-causal 
terms: I choose such and such a tie to go with such and such a 
shirt - sometimes one combination and sometimes another is 
appropriate (depending upon the occasion and the conventions that I 
am aware of governing this area of conduct). This is not on the 
face of it a causal explanation of the sort that McGinn is thinking 
of (i.e., Humean Causation). (And if the example seems to beg the 
question this is no more question-begging than McGinn's assumption 
that causal explanation is the only real form of explanation.) The 
second objection is more serious. It is that the idea of cause and 
effect itself begins to vanish on the objective assumption. For 
along with our anthropocentric point of view goes a system of
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classification by means of which causes and effects may be picked 
out from the flux of physical happenings around us. Events emerge 
as such only under a description. So even though we imagine, as 
McGinn points out, that "the interactions between objects proceed 
independently of the experiences of perceivers", this is true only 
in the sense that if there were no perceivers things would still 
happen. There would still be a world and there would still be 
events. But we could form no idea of such a world. For although 
events may not depend upon human perceivers for their existence, 
events under a certain description do so depend upon perceivers. 
And part of that description will involve subjective, or 
anthropocentric, elements. So if McGinn is to sustain the claim 
that there are non-anthropocentric causal explanations he must show 
more than that causes are themselves non-anthropocentric. He must 
show that their description is non-anthropocentric. He must show 
that there can be an absolute definition of cause and effect, that 
there is an absolute description of the world and of the events 
that take place in this world''®. The problem is, however, that the 
objective/absolute conception of the world lacks the resources to 
pick out a huge variety of events. (It is possible to see this in 
the generalizing tendency of scientific enterprises. As a theory 
grows more comprehensive it reduces elements of particularity - it 
refers less and less to particular circumstances. It seeks to 
render more diverse phenomena intelligible in terms of fewer and 
fewer specialized or particular laws, In the the end the theory 
gives basic entities - atoms, electromagnetic waves, quanta, etc - 
plus laws of extreme generality: these are the entire resources of
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the objective conception at this point. The only events on this 
conception are such things as collisions, repulsions, quantum- 
leaps, or whatever. Clearly, the phenomenal richness of events is 
lost. The macro-aspect of these micro-events is altogether
impossible to articulate. It is as though - to use a metaphor of
David Wiggins' - we were to look at a cell through a microscope:
although we see the internal structure of the cell, and in that 
sense understand the cell minutely, we fail to grasp the cell in a 
larger sense, we miss the role of the cell within the body as a 
whole...) The idea of an event under a completely objective 
description, i.e., a description that describes causes as they 
really are independently of their representation by the human mind, 
may be likened to the notion of an absolute definition of cause, 
that is a cause defined in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions. The difficulties of the latter enterprise are 
considerable"'®. Both ideas express the metaphysical ideal of final 
or absolute explanation. In short, it is possible to argue that 
the idea of a cause is itself an anthropocentric notion, is 
dependent upon a specifically human view of the world. It cannot 
be used, therefore, to drive a wedge between that which really 
exists, and so really enters into explanation, and that which only 
seems to exist due to the representational peculiarities of the 
mind.
Serious doubt, then, can be cast upon the possibility of a 
conception of reality that is absolute in the sense that it 
transcends and ultimately dispenses with subjective conceptions of
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the world. This Is the concept of a vision purified to the point 
of transparency. In the terms of another metaphor: It is the
concept of a world without the means of sustaining human life'^. 
And with that thought I should like to turn to some of the views of 
Aristotle, which are relevant in this connection. Aristotle was 
often concerned to argue against a moral theory of austere and 
transcendent character rather than a specifically 
ontological/epistemological theory of that character (such as is 
considered above). But his arguments are quite general. Aristotle 
opposed transcendentalism on two counts. First, it is not a 
practical alignment on any subject matter (and remember that 
Aristotle's aim is essentially practical: "clearly it [the
transcendent good] could not be achieved or attained by man; but we 
are now seeking something attainable." Jficamachean Ethics, I. 6. 
My emphasis). The transcendent goal is not a practical goal. A 
transcendent standard is not a standard that we could hope to 
attain. Martha Mussbaum, for example, writes: "Aristotle
emphasizes repeatedly that the goal of his ethical discourse is not 
theoretical but practical. It follows from this that there is no 
point to talking about the good life in an ethical enquiry insofar 
as this life is not practically attainable by beings with our 
capabilities. The life of a divine being might be ever so 
admirable; but the study of this life, insofar as it lies beyond 
our capabilities, is not pertinent to the practical aims of 
ethics." (.The Fragility of Goodness, p. 292/293.) Secondly, a 
transcendental alignment necessarily aims beyond the the 
parochialism of anthropocentricity. It is, we might say, an un-
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human (rather than inhuman) alignment. Says Aristotle: "clearly
the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we were 
seeking was human good and the happiness human happiness" I,
13. Human properties are of no particular concern on a 
transcendental view. The peculiarly human perspective is
abandoned. And this amounts to nothing less than a rejection of 
human identity. Says Hussbaum: "[The life we choose] must be a
life that we, as we deliberate, can choose for ourselves as a life 
that is really a life for us, a life in which there will be enough 
of what makes us the beings we are for us to be said to survive in 
such a life." (.The Fragility of Goodness, p. 193.) The relevance of 
these thoughts to the issue of the objectivity of aesthetic 
judgement should be plain enough. First, the fact that a position 
outside all human concerns fails to find support for those concerns 
is not only unsurprising, it is uninteresting. The crucial point, 
which cannot be overlooked, is that we do not occupy a position 
outside human concerns. And why should we (supposing we could)?""^ 
The fact that the objective view of things finds no place for 
aesthetic value simply shows the irrelevance of the objective view 
for the aesthetic understanding. In this life we cannot but 
encounter aesthetic value and it is the practical aim of 
aesthetics, or thought about the goodness of experience in general, 
to render the field of aesthetic appreciation intelligible, to 
bring it into clearer focus, and to reveal its complexities. This 
is the fact from which we start - this is the given, the form of 
life. Second, a non-anthropocentric alignment on the world aims to 
supplant the subjective human perspective. But, given the
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scepticism expressed above about the possibility of doing without 
some sort of perspective, the rejection of the human perspective 
would necessitate the adaption of some other perspective. And even 
were this possible - and it's a very strange idea - we have no 
reason for doing any such thing. For all perspectives are, surely, 
on the same level. Also, the human point of view is in some sense 
constitutive of the human condition. Far from being evidence of 
the human state of error and confusion (the epistemologically 
fallen state of man) it is the distinctive frame within which
humans work. The later ideas of Wittgenstein are relevant here. 
It is not a matter for despair that we are forever within a human 
conceptual system. Ve are not thereby doomed to a distorted 
picture of the world. For we only feel at home within this system. 
It is here that our distinctions and our discriminations have their 
point. The human system is our only frame of reference. Says
Wittgenstein: "I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying 
myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied
of its correctness. Mo; it is the inherited background agaist
which I distinguish between true and false" (On Certainty, 94). 
The human point of view provides our only terms of reference. If 
we abandon these terms of reference we shall have none. We shall 
in the end have no basis for any discriminations whatever.
The idea, then, that value does not exist as an objective 
fact rests upon a metaphysical notion of objectivity that is 
unattainable, impracticable, and without special appeal. Mo 
priority attaches to the objective conception of the world. It is
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one conception amongst many, a perspicuous representation of soma 
things but not of others. This is not to say that the enterprise 
of objective scientific enquiry is pointless or Ill-conceived or 
harmful in itself. It is just to say that the scientific view is 
not the be-all and end-all of explanation. It provides an
explanation rather than the explanation. What the objective 
conception lacks are the expressive resources to do justice to the 
full range of human experience. Consequently, the location of
aesthetic value (and everything else that the objective view is
ill-equipped to show) in some dimension of the world is necessary
if our self-understanding, and our aspirations to self-knowledge, 
are not to be subject to artificial restriction. The difficulty is 
to understand how this 'value-location' is to be achieved'^.
II
At least one major philosophical tradition, deriving in part 
from Hume and Kant, propagates the view that a man is a 
partnership, or an association, of reason and desire (as a lichen 
is an association of an algae and a fungus). Most often these 
faculties work in concert, e.g., deliberating how best to satisfy a 
desire. Sometimes they are at odds, e.g., weakness of will^®. It 
is essential to this view of man, however, that reason and desire 
be recognized as mutually autonomous - in principle if not in 
practice. That is to say that reason must be a pure capacity, 
theoretically capable of 'clear-sighted' operation (examples of
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disinterested rationality are logic and science), and desire must 
conceivably be simply appetitive, a brute want awaiting 
modification and guidance in the light of reason (examples of brute 
wants would be what Thomas Magel calls 'unmotivated desires': 
hunger, thirst, sexual desire, and so forth). The picture is a 
familiar one. Desire furnishes basic motivation, i.e., sets the 
ends of action, and reason both determines efficient means and 
picks out those features of the world relevant to a given desire. 
Says Hume: "[Reason] can have an influence on our conduct only
after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by Informing us of 
the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when 
it discovers the connection of causes and effects, so as to afford 
us means of exerting any passion" iA Treatise of Human Mature, 
p.459).
The point to focus on at this juncture is the 
characterization that has been given of desire, of human 
motivation. The fundamental sources of human motivation are here 
conceived as original existences, sui generis impulses, wholly 
contingent internal propellants of the human organism. Says Hume: 
"our passions, volitions, and actions are not susceptible 
of... agreement or disagreement [with real matters of fact or 
relations of ideas]; being original facts and realities, compleat 
in themselves" (Ibid, p.458). The phrase 'compleat in themselves' 
effectively seals passions and volitions off from the external 
world: they are not answerable to nor are they cognizant of the
facts. These blind Impulses will frequently manifest themselves as
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Difficulties arise for this account when we take seriously 
the idea that desires and the rest are truly 'brute'. As ¥iggins 
says, we are to imagine value as arising from the presence of a 
mysterious pro-attitude - "some extra oomph" - which does not 
result from or in any way effect cognition^’ (Ibid, p. 97). This 
oomph is closely associated with pleasure - it is perhaps the
disposition or the tendency to take pleasure in an activity or
state of affairs. Pleasure is the candidate psychological state 
here because there seems virtually no room at all between pleasure 
and the right kind of pro-attitude or positive motivating factor; 
there seems a logical relation between the taking of pleasure in 
something and the taking of a pro-attitude towards it - it is
difficult to imagine someone taking genuine pleasure in something 
while adopting a negative attitude towards it®"^ . Pleasure is as 
near as it seems possible to get to an Intrinsic good. The
disposition to take pleasure in this or that attaches itself, so to 
speak, in a wholly contingent manner to things in the world. 
Consequently, there is no more rationality to my basic valuations 
than there is to the salivating of a Pavlovian dog. Reason goes to 
work after the desire is in place. The initial emplacement of the 
desire is a dark process; but it is certain that reason has no role 
to play. All actual motivations stem from brute desires, either 
directly or as rational consequences of those desires.
One difficulty with the idea of a brute motivation of this 
kind is that the motivating desire must be identified by essential 
reference to that for which it is the desire. Otherwise it is a
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nothing - it is just a source of 'potential motivation', like the 
energy stored in a battery, or a coiled spring. And if the desire 
is for something very general, e.g., pleasure, there is very little 
explanatory value in the postulation of the desire; why did the 
spring uncoil at this time and in this manner, why did the energy 
dissipate along this avenue? If, on the other hand, the desire is 
for something very particular, e.g., a chocolate-chip ice-cream, 
the generality required of explanation is lost; the release of 
energy is a different phenomenon every time. A companion dilemma 
to the dilemma encountered earlier (pp. 18-20) arises here: either 
the content of the desire is determinate, in which case the desire 
ceases to count as a general motivation; or the content of the 
desire is indeterminate, in which case it ceases to count as an 
explanation of motivation. The desire is too broad in scope or it 
is too narrow in scope. If it is too broad it will explain nothing 
- all and every motivation will arise from the same source'^#. If 
it is too narrow we shall require any number of brute desires of 
extreme particularity in order to account for motivation^*. 
Despite the difficulties pleasure is frequently nominated as the 
most general source of motivation. A desire for pleasure seems to 
render motivation intelligible - for who could argue that pleasure 
is to be sought, i.e., willed? - while allowing extreme latitude 
in the specification of what constitutes pleasurable activity. And 
herein lies the difficulty. The task of keeping pleasure-seeking 
non-cognltive, of keeping pleasure itself out of the reckoning, is 
difficult in the extreme.
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Another difficulty concerns the fact that pleasure, on this 
view, constitutes the only source of value, Only the pleasure that 
satisfaction of a brute desire yields is intrinsically worthwhile. 
Aesthetic value, then, comes from the desire for certain pleasures. 
It does seem, after all, that aesthetics has something to do with 
pleasure. (Though, as has been pointed out more than once, much 
art does not exactly deliver straight pleasure - it may be 
disturbing or distressing, it may involve much intellectual effort, 
and so forth.) So, on the non-cognitivist view, the worth of all 
things is e:rtrlnsic, it comes from outside, and such value as 
things have is related directly to the extent to which they conduce 
to aesthetic pleasure. But in aesthetics, as in morals, we value 
things because we see them as intrinsically worthwhile. And in 
aesthetics no less than in morals we frequently recognize a 
multiplicity of Intrinsic goods - e.g., simplicity, perspicuity, 
comprehensiveness, richness, and so on. And we may recognize that 
these intrinsic goods are not only not commensurable by a single 
standard but that they are even incompatible in some circumstances 
(for example, a rich and imaginatively fecund work may be forced to 
forego the sort of simplicity and classical elegance that a work of 
more limited scope and means can afford - so we say: this music is 
great and expansive at the expense of formal excellence; or: this 
music is great in spite of formal flaws). It is implausible to 
suppose that pleasure is a simple psychological state or quanitity. 
The pleasure that I take in something is responsive to the value 
that I believe the thing to objectively have. This kind of 
fulfillment cannot be separated from those activities that secure
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fulfillment. It is questionable, therefore, that the articulacy, 
comprehensiveness, and precision of our aesthetic values derive 
from the rational pursuit of a single end such as pleasure,
The idea of intrinsic goods leads to the related idea of 
intentionality. The non-cognitivist account may be charged with 
misdescribing the directedness of desires and values. Aesthetic 
value is to all appearances a response to something 'out there' in 
the world. As John McDowe11 puts it; "Aesthetic experience |
typically presents Itself, at least in part, as a confrontation 1
with value; an awareness of value as something residing in an I
object and available to be encountered. It thus invites the |
thought that value is...part of the fabric of the world""®. It 
certainly does not appear as the non-cognitivist says it is.
Aesthetic thinking is directed outward, is responsive to the world, 
etc. Whether this art-work is more deserving of attention than 
that does not feel like a matter of personal preference - it is 
often a serious question to which great effort may be applied. And 
very many complex issues will enter into the final appraisal. This 
is very far from the sort of blunt introspective assessment that 
the non-cognitivist account might lead us to expect. (This is not 
to say that all questions of preference that are decldeable by 
introspection are easy questions: whether I prefer, on balance,
strawberry ice-cream to banana ice-cream may be excruciatingly 
difficult to determine. But the issue is as simple as that - no 
other concerns can be brought to bear upon the matter (Wiggins’ 
phrase, 'aborescence of concerns', is again relevant...)). When I
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Justify an aesthetic judgement, or when I attempt to articulate an 
aesthetic response, my sole concern is with features of the object 
of my attention. I am not giving voice to my emotional state - at 
least not in the same way as when I say a hot bath is soothing and 
a cold drink enlivening^®,
III
The attempt, then, to locate value in the world by making 
value a manifestation of desire in the end grossly misdescribes the 
phenomenology of value. It assimilates all value to a kind of 
wanting. And although value and desire alike do seem to be species 
of pro-attitude the identification of the one with the other has 
prlmae facia plausibility only. For it is important to note that 
the concept of value is very often used in order to mark a 
distinction between pro-attitudes of subjective and objective 
character (an 'objective good' and a 'subjective good'). To soy of 
someone that their valuations are an expression of desire is often 
to say that their valuations are either a sham or a self-deception. 
It is, for example, nearly always a reproof to accuse someone of 
valuing a thing only because they desire it. Thus the person who 
positively espouses slothful behaviour may be accused of 
rationalizing laziness, Ve shall say; 'There is nothing good about 
laziness, and you know it, you simply love home-comforts* . And it 
is a common form of self-deception to say of something that you 
cannot attain, but would like to, that it is after all not really
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worth striving after. To say of something that it is valuable is, 
therefore, not the same as saying that you happen to like it. (The 
non-cognitivist, of course, will argue that however much the 
phenomenology suggests the objectivity of value - and there may be 
no doubt that the phenomenology does so suggest the objectivity of 
value ~ there is no warrant for passing from an apparently 
objective phenomenology to an objectivist account of value. But 
the onus is surely on the non-cognitivist to show why the 
phenomenology ought to be mistrusted.>
There are two ideas which are influential in bringing about 
the equation of value with desire. The first has been dealt with 
at some length already, namely, the idea that value is not a
feature of the world as it is in itself. It is impossible on this 
view that the phenomenology of value be correct. The phenomenology
- which suggests the reality of value - and the facts of the matter
- which suggest the (absolute) unreality of value - come into
direct conflict. The world, objectively conceived, lacks value. 
However, the objective conception of the world has been found
wanting. The objective conception, quite apart from its tendency 
to shrink to nothing, limits the real so strictly that virtually 
nothing that we customarily encounter in the world really exists: 
an entire dimension of human life simply vanishes. And the correct 
response to this is to say, not that it's too bad for the 
subjective dimensions of human life, but rather that it's too bad 
for the objective conception of the world^^.
36.
The second Idea is that value is too strange a quality by far 
to be in the world. If this objection is not to be just a 
reiteration of the first objection it must rest upon grounds other 
than that value is anthropocentric. And the objection appears to 
amount to this: if value is to be an object of knowledge it must
like all other items of cognition be perceptible. And although we 
are always seeming to perceive value in the world the perception 
involved must be a strange affair: for by what sense do we perceive 
value? And how could a bare perception bring with it the kind of 
pro-attitude that value has in train? If we are to be said to have 
knowledge of value then the character of value must be immediately 
apparent (as is the phenomenal character of red) or it must be 
logically deducible from sense-experience. But value does not seem 
to be presented to us with the immediacy of the usual sense- 
impressions. Mor does it seem deducible from sense-impressions. 
This is the so-called ’argument from queerness’. Hume offers the 
following version: "As the operations of human understanding divide 
themselves into two kinds, the comparing of ideas, and the 
inferring of matter of fact; were virtue dlscovr’d by the 
understanding; it must be an object of one of these operations, nor 
is there any third operation of the understanding, which can 
discover it." (Treatise, p.463). It seems obvious to Hume that 
value does not consist in the comparing of Ideas (for Hume even the 
idea that beauty consists in formal properties of objects would not 
suffice to show that aesthetic values are evident from the 
comparing of ideas, since in addition to the formal properties 
there would be required a positive motivational component, i.e., a
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pro-attitude). And it seems obvious also that value is not a 
matter of fact, since although it sometimes appears that we have 
the idea (in the Humean sense) of value, there is no impression 
corresponding to this idea.
The argument from queerness trades heavily upon an 
unfavourable comparison of value with sense-experience. Whereas 
the senses furnish Immediate hard data - pre-theoretical atomic 
sensations - the perception of value seems essentially mediated by 
concepts. Value is not perceived directly by any of the senses. 
And since the senses are the source of all knowledge value cannot 
be amongst things knovra...(The senses are, on this view, sources of 
hard data. Everything - all knowledge, all belief, all speculation 
on matters of fact - is answerable to the hard data of the senses. 
All the scientific theories of man might be demolished tomorrow but 
the data presented by the senses would survive without the 
slightest alteration. For the presentations of sense-experience 
are epistemologically prior to any theory. All theory, all 
conceptualization, is grounded in sense-data. All theories are 
accountable to sense-data. For the world of everyday is logically 
constructed out of simple sensation.)
The question arises: are aesthetic values, e.g., beauty,
amongst the hard data of the senses? The answer appears to be that 
they are not. The hard data of the senses are comprised of simple 
sensory qualities - redness, hardness, sweetness, loudness, etc. 
These are undefinable, atomic, irreducible. Aesthetic values do
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not share the apparent self-evidence and immediacy of this sort of 
sensation. If aesthetic values do not appear amongst the simple 
sensations are they logically inferred from simple sensations? The 
answer again appears to be that they are not. Aesthetic values do 
not amount to logically complex descriptions (as the difference 
between a movement of the arm and an action is not a difference of 
logical complexity, or the difference between black dots on a white 
ground and a picture-face is not a difference of logical 
complexity). The difficulty here is how something with the 
phenomenal properties of value can logically follow from basic 
sensations of a completely different character.
The argument from queerness involves, implicitly, the belief 
that there are amongst sensations what might be called natural 
distinctions. The world presents various arrays of qualities and 
we cannot but perceive the structure of the array, Distinctions as 
it were force themselves upon us. Ve should, for instance, have to 
be blind, or lacking in some sensory capacity, not to distinguish 
all the colours that we customarily distinguish (as well as all the 
colour-properties that we customarily discriminate, e.g., hue, 
saturation, complimentariness, etc). Pre-theoretical sensation is 
of a determinate enough character to allow concepts to be 
abstracted from it. The concepts that we apply to experience are 
legitimized by the structure of experience.
It is questionable whether this account of sensation and its 
relation to concepts is correct. For one thing, it is an account
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formulated after concept-acquisition. Pre-theoretical
consciousness is not available to the language-user. The 
distinctions that sensation appears to force upon us, to wear upon 
its face, may for all that just be distinctions that we are taught 
to make - i.e., perhaps nothing leads us to make these
distinctions. It is no use attempting to 'think out' the 
conceptual content of experience. Minimal descriptions of 
experience (a red blotch adjacent to a number of blue-and white 
blotches; a rapidly-fluctuating series of sounds; etc, etc.) do not 
necessarily amount to descriptions of experience-minus-the- 
concepts. (Of course, the logical atomism of this view encourages 
the idea that the only difference between raw sensation and complex 
experience is one of logical complexity. It is therefore only 
necessary to undo the logical knots that connect a complex 
experience to its constituent basic experiences to arrive at the 
non-complex basis of experience.)
An example may show the issue to better advantage. Ve 
imagine that all the concepts applicable to sensation lie open to 
us. It seems, for example, inconceivable that someone should 
discover a new colour. If we imagine the colour-vislon of the 
wasp, which extends farther into the blue end of the spectrum than 
human vision, we imagine colours that we can see, perhaps enhanced 
in some way, given additional 'sparkle* or luminosity - sc we 
imagine a limpid or throbbing electric blue, and so forth. But we 
do not imagine that it is similarly inconceivable that a new form 
of value be discovered. Perhaps this is what happens when new
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artforms develop or when the tastes of a society change. When John 
McDowell says that value presents Itself as "something residing in 
an object and available to be encountered!' (my emphasis) he chooses 
his words carefully. Value, he suggests, is available but not
compulsory - it is like an infection, available, to infect but not 
without exception infectious. And the idea is that certain values 
may exist but not be encountered. Ve do not imagine, though, that 
colour-perceptlon is likewise ’chancy’ or ’optional'. Ve feel that 
it is impossible for a person with the requisite sensory apparatus 
to fail to encounter all the colours and all the colour-quallties 
that we encounter. There therefore seems to be a crucial
disanalogy between sensory qualities that appear to inhere in the 
world and the value qualities that appear to inhere in the world. 
The former impress themselves upon us with the force of self­
evidence. The latter are far more fugitive, fitful, and fickle. 
Which is to say, first, that we often do not hesitate to pronounce 
the colour of a thing but we might ponder an object's aesthetic
character, and pemain unsure about this for some time; second,
there seems no question of offering the sort of argument in favour 
of a colour-concept as might be offered in support of an aesthetic 
concept - we feel that either someone sees the correct colour or 
they don't.
But the correct parallel for perceiving new forms of value is 
not perceiving an entirely new colour (as though new perceptual 
apparatus had sprouted...) It is seeing colour in a different way. 
I.e., the correct parallel is having new ways of talking about
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colour. Mo new colour miraculously enters experience. Yet colour- 
perception Is altered. Different parts of experience connect up. 
Different slants on the world come to the fore. Likewise, the’ 
correct parallel for the philistine, or the person to whom certain 
kinds of value are imperceptible, is not the colour-blind person, 
or the blind person (or the tone-deaf person, etc). It is the 
person whose colour-vocabulary is limited (they say that a colour 
is jolly and bright or dark and depressing. They cannot articulate 
more complex perceptions, of saturation, hue, colour-relationships, 
etc.).
On this view the distinctions that we make between basic 
sensations are learned distinctions. And so too are aesthetic
distinctions. The metaphysical gulf between aesthetic experience 
and sense experience is, on this account, closed. The next chapter 
will explore this idea further.
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Chapter Two.
The programme of locating value in some dimension of the 
world (see p.28) continues in this chapter. Initial sceptical 
questions have been held at arm's length, creating a breathing- 
space for aesthetic value. But it is not clear Just how value is 
to be placed in the world, the role that it is to play, how it may 
be brought into the arena of rationality at large. It is to these 
questions that the present chapter turns.
Of this chapter the first section is occupied with putting 
forward the worries of the sceptic/non-cognitlvist. One particular 
worry concerns how aesthetic terms, which seem not to have a 
determinate meaning (or, at any rate, seem resistant to easy 
definition), can be deployed meaningfully in discussion. A 
connection is made out, on behalf of the non-cognitivist, between 
definability and rationality. The non-cognitivist thesis is, 
therefore, that aesthetic terms, not being amenable to definition, 
are not amenable to rational appraisal, i.e., cannot take part in 
the sort of activities we have come to regard as constitutive of 
rationality - normative argument, discussion, demonstration, proof 
and refutation, etc.
The worry arises because it is easy to see what 'red' or 
'sour' refers to, it is easy to present someone with a clear and 
paradigmatic sample of red or sour; but it is not easy to see what, 
for instance, 'elegant' refers to (note, incidentally, the relation
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between this worry and the epistemological version of the argument 
from queerness, which trades upon the elusiveness of value). Even 
if we were to give someone an elegant object we could not indicate 
just where the elegance lay. Thus a question mark appears to hang 
over elegance - or any aesthetic quality - which, it seeiis, does 
not hang over red or sour. I.e., the concept 'red' or the concept 
'sour' holds a determinate place in discussion (everyone knows what
these concepts mean); but the concept 'elegant' cannot be pinned
down. The rationality of discussions involving aesthetic concepts 
is threatened by this persistent unclarity.
The aim of the second section is in effect to make more
clear, in the light of an objection such as this, the implications 
of the non-empiricist epistemology encountered at the end of the 
first chapter. Where the license for applying a concept comes
from, if not from sense-experience, is discussed, and the
complexity, the possible semantic richness, of 'open' or 'loose' 
concepts is considered. The upshot is that a concept's resistance 
to encapsulation in a pithy formula or a precise definition
(manageable definition) is not a sign that the concept has no 
meaning. Therefore, these concepts may enter into determinate 
discussions and, no less than precisely-defined concepts such as 
those employed in the sciences, may allow rational discussion. In
other words, aesthetic concepts need not admit of succinct
definition to be capable of supporting, or of entering into, 
rational discussion. These considerations occupy the second
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section, and effectively answer the sceptical questions raised in 
the first section.
The third section introduces a different worry. This is that 
aesthetic terms, even if governed by conditions, are not wholly 
governed: there must be room for personal feeling to operate. The 
view is propounded that aesthetic terms have a dual meaning, one 
factual and condition-governed, the other emotive and free- 
floating. Grains of irrationality, therefore, remain in
aesthetics. . The third chapter takes up this point.
There is a difficulty, perceived to be common to both ethics 
and aesthetics, to do with the meaning of many of the concepts 
characteristic of - indeed essential to - aesthetic and ethical 
activity. Whereas, e.g., the meaning of 'prime number', or 
'bachelor', or 'one mole of potassium permanganate' is quite clear 
- such that we can't imagine an argument arising over what 
constitutes a prime number or one mole of a substance (though of 
course there can be arguments over whether a particular number, say 
18549003, is prime, or whether so many grams of a substance is 
really one mole, etc) - the meaning of 'x is a good painting' or 'y 
is a good man' is not so clear. What are we saying of a man if we 
say that he is a good man? What qualities must an object have if 
it is to be an aesthetically good (beautiful) object? Have we in
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either case said anything determinate about the man or the object? 
Similarly, what it means to say that someone is 'depraved' or 
'honourable', or what it means to say that something is 'elegant' 
or 'sensitive', is unclear - at least, it is not so clear as what 
makes a number a prime number, or what makes a man a bachelor, or 
what makes a quantity of a chemical a mole of that chemical. The 
différence may be brought out by considering that the concepts 
'prime number', 'molar quantity' and 'bachelor' can be applied 
fairly mechanically: a computer could be programmed to pick out
prime numbers from a list or an array of numbers; to compute the 
mass of one mole Cor whatever) of any chemical for which it was 
given the formula; or to identify the marital status of people for 
whom it held records. But could a computer be relied upon to apply 
the concepts 'elegant' and 'sensitive' c o r r ectly?^# There are no 
computers - no programmes - in existence today that could 
distinguish between the elegant and the inelegant across a range of 
objects, e.g., string-quartets, kinetic sculptures, motor-car 
dashboard designs, hairstyles, speeches, etc, etc. And the 
important point is that, if asked to write the appropriate 
programme, we should not know where to begin. And of course the 
same is true for concepts like 'depraved', 'honourable', 'just', 
and the like.
So what does this establish? .Are we to say that we do not 
know what goodness, or beauty, Is? Are we to say that the concepts 
that enter into ethics and aesthetics have no determinate meaning? 
For the indefInability of these concepts seems to throw up such
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questions as: How do we know elegance when we see it? Vhat
considerations lead us to say that a poem, for example, is recited 
sensitively? Just what differentiates an honourable action from a 
dishonourable action? And so on. The general questions that come 
to the fore are: What is it precisely that makes an object
beautiful or makes a man good? Were clear definitions available
these questions, it is to be supposed, would not arise. For if 
someone said of a man that he was a good man, or if someone said of
an object that it was a beautiful object, it would be possible pin
down exactly what was at issue. A checking procedure could be
brought to bear, and the goodness of the man or the beauty of the 
object could be established conclusively. Failure of strict 
definition seems, ultimately, to undermine various rational 
procedures, e.g., analysis, comparison, verlficlation. Thus If 
aesthetic or ethical terms cannot be defined satisfatorily the 
rationality of ethics and aesthetics is called into question; 
crudely, the problem in any particular case becomes: what is the
discussion really about? In what follows I shall argue that the
rationality of an activity is not dependent upon its being amenable
to simple formalization. Mor is the possibility of Iormy 1izatlon 
an condition of the existence of rationality in an activity.
In an introductory book on Aesthetics^^ Anne Sheppard
discusses the elusiveness of the definition of beauty. She 
rejects, first of all, the idea that beauty may be defined as a 
simple quality available to us via some sort of intuitive faculty. 
This, she says, "is in effect a refusal to engage in further
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discussion." <p.61). It Is, she thinks, hardly an improvement to
define beauty in terms of more specific aesthetic concepts such as 
'elegant', 'picturesque', 'coarse', etc. She says: "If we say that 
beauty is to be defined in terms of more specific aesthetic 
qualities we are faced with a very large range of qualities of 
different types...These more specific qualities themselves require 
definition. In particular it remains unclear just how they are 
related to the qualities that give rise to them, how daintiness, 
for example, is related to smallness and neatness. Neatness might 
itself be considered an aesthetic quality: how is it in turn to be 
defined?" Cp.62/63). I.e., a definition of the aesthetically good
in terms of aesthetic qualities falls to resolve the vagueness of 
'aesthetic' - the heart of the problem is left Intact; the problem 
is simply fragmented. In the run up to this passage Sheppard 
mentions the key difficulty, namely, that "it is not possible to 
specify a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which must all 
be satisfied if something is to count as dainty, majestic, or 
graceful." (p.62) And she finds unsatisfactory the idea that our 
best definition of 'dainty', for example, may oblige us to "fall 
back on saying something like, 'Dainty people are usually small and 
neat' and on offering examples" (p.62). (What is unsatisfactory 
about these definitions is that the essential thing is again missed 
out: what, e.g., is daintiness?) Clearly, her requirement, that
with which she will feel comfortable, is the kind of clarity and 
rigour that is to be found in mathematics or science, exemplified 
by concepts such as 'prime number', 'molar quantity', 'bachelor', 
etc. For she gives every indication of being quite dissatisfied
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with definitions which retain so to speak the smallest particle of 
vagueness, i.e., definitions which 'fall back* on approximations, 
rules of thumb, and statements of a general kind.
Sheppard, however, objects not only to the attempt to define 
the beautiful in terms of other, more particular, aesthetic 
qualities; she objects also to the attempt to define the beautiful 
in terms of non-aesthetic qualities. There is always a gap, she 
says, between the factual description and the aesthetic evaluation. 
She concludes; "Attempts to define beauty in terms of particular 
non-aesthetic qualities are always open to counter-examples; 
suggested definitions are always both too narrow, in failing to 
include instances of beauty, and too wide, in failing to exclude 
instances which have the relevant non-aesthetic qualities and yet 
are not beautiful." Cp.6.3>. Obviously, such charges could not be 
laid against definitions of 'prime number' or of 'molar quantity' 
or of 'bachelor'. In these cases there is no 'overlap' or 
'underlap', no gap between the extension of the concept and the
extension of the definition: the definiens and the definiendum fit
one another like hand and glove.
So Sheppard rejects three attempts to define beauty. These 
attempts fail, she says, because "they cannot account
satisfactorily for the nature of aesthetic appreciation and for the
relationship between aesthetic judgements and purely descriptive 
judgements, because they cannot explain how we can offer reasons 
for our aesthetic judgements, make aesthetic comparisons, and
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attempt to resolve aesthetic disagreements." (p.64). Now
undoubtedly the first account of beauty that Sheppard considers - 
that it is a simple quality that we perceive via intuition - has 
little to say on these matters. The perception of beauty on this 
account is unanalysable. Therefore an anatomy, of the aesthetic 
judgement is not to be expected, How one intuition is pitted 
against another and how one intuition may be defended against 
another is, admittedly, unclear. So Sheppard's criticisms are I
perhaps justified. But what of the idea that the concept of beauty |
breaks down into, or is an umbrella term for, a great many other |
aesthetic concepts? Or of the idea that aesthetic concepts are |
governed by conditions that may be stated in non-aesthetic terms? !
Why should the fact that no definition of aesthetic concepts in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is forthcoming !
preclude a satisfactory account of the rationality of aesthetic i
activity?
The problem that I started with was; what do we mean when we I
say that a man is good or that an object is beautiful? Have we 
said anything about the world and if we have what have we said? I '
have suggested that Anne Sheppard's discussion of the concept 
'beautiful* implies the thesis that rationality and definability 
are bound together such that where there are no precise definitions 
there is either an impaired rationality or there is no rationality 
at all - rationality can get little or no no purchase on loosely- 
defined concepts (see, in this connection, pp. 47/48, and section 
II of this chapter, especially pp. 62-67; the latter in particular
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examines the idea that rationality and definability are logically 
related). That thesis is, in effect, the claim that we are 
unlikely to arrive at a better understanding of the meaning of 
aesthetic concepts by looking closely at the fine aesthetic 
judgements that we make or by looking at the factual judgements
that we might bring out in support them. And this, it seems to me, {1is quite false^°. For although I too want to argue that 
definitions fail I want to claim that their failure is not to be 
treated as an indication of the 'queerness* or 
unreality/irrationality of aesthetic concepts. I want to argue 
initially that there is an intelligible relation between 'purely 
factual* judgements and judgements of aesthetic value; aesthetic 
concepts are, we might say, weJ1 -governecP' . Hence we can see how 
arguments may arise and be settled. We can see how an aesthetic 
discussion might proceed: it will proceed like many another
discussion, e.g., is this magenta or is it orange? Is his manner 
better described as stately or as supercilious? Am I truly anxious 
or am I merely dramatizing my own situation? And so on. The
choice of an aesthetic term may be no more and no less delicate a 
matter than the choice of any 'purely descriptive' term. And that 
is to say that the looseness of an aesthetic concept does not
preclude its hanging on a great many subtle conditions, nor from 
communicating an extremely precise meaning.
Since Sheppard charges definitions of beauty with an
inability, specifically, to give a satisfactory account of the 
rationality of aesthetic activity I shall consider it incumbent
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upon the present account to at least go some way towards meeting 
that challenge. Sheppard's challenge comprises at least four sub- 
challenges; first, to account for the relationship between
aesthetic judgements and purely descriptive judgements; second, to 
explain how we can offer reasons for our aesthetic judgements;
third, to explain how we can make aesthetic comparisons; and, 
fourth, to explain how we can attempt to resolve aesthetic
disagreements.
So what I want to consider now is the possibility that 
concepts that can be defined only loosely, which in the and elude, 
for all practical purposes (such as programming a computer), 
definition, can nonetheless support argument and discussion, can be 
answerable to 'factual judgements', can allow aesthetic
comparisons, and so forth. I shall be arguing, therefore, that
precision of the sort required by Sheppard is not a prerequisite of 
rationality.
II
Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations, asks us to 
imagine replacing blurred outlines in one picture with sharp 
outlines in another. Then he says; "But if the colours in the 
original merge without a hint of any outline won't it become a 
hopeless task to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred 
one? Won't you then have to say: 'Here I might as well draw a
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circle or a heart as a rectangle, for all the colours merge. 
Anything - and nothing - is right. ' - And this is the position you 
are in if you look for definitions corresponding to our concepts in 
aesthetics or ethics." (.Philosophical Investigations, 77). In 
other words, the concepts of aesthetics and ethics all run into one 
another, and it is not possible to lay down with any precision the 
logically necessary and sufficient conditions under which the 
concepts apply. (That is to say that the task of attempting to 
formalize the concepts of ethics and aesthetics is to be likened to 
the attempt to draw strict boundaries where none can be drawn. It 
is a hopeless enterprise. And Wittgenstein's larger point Is that 
a certain kind of philosophizing spirit will make no headway in 
ethics or .aesthetics because no general statements may be made'’"-. 
The boundaries that philosophy of this sort seeks to draw will be 
stipulative rather than descriptive...) Wittgenstein does not say, 
however, that these 'blurred concepts' are therefore useless, or 
second-rate, or otherwise 'half-baked*. Indeed, the sections
Immediately following and immediately proceeding the section here 
quoted are devoted to showing that such a conclusion is 
unwarranted.
Wittgenstein argues^^, first, that a truly vast number of
concepts does not conform to the necessary-and-sufficlent- 
conditions model. To suppose otherwise is to conceive of language 
as a mechanical construct governed at all points by strict rules 
("For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and what did
lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or
53.
understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite 
rules." P.I. 81). Terms that may be rigorously formalized are the 
exception rather than the rule, and are more or less confined to 
specialized disciplines such as science and mathematics. In 
natural language it is usual for a tremendous complex of diverse 
relations to hold between concepts. These relations Wittgenstein 
described, famously, as like the resemblances between members of a 
family. Just as an individual is not deemed to have the 
physiognomy characteristic of a particular family on the basis of 
some one invariable feature that he has in common with all other 
members of the family so particular instances are not deemed to 
fall under a given concept on the basis of some one invariable 
feature that all have in common and which the concept 'names*. 1
Wittgenstein argues, secondly, that a 'blurred concept' is no |
less useful, and therefore no less legitimate, than a 'sharp j
Îconcept' . The blurred concept may achieve an end no less I
effectively than the sharp concept. Moreover, the idea that really 
puts blurred concepts in a bad light, namely the idea that they are 
approximations to or imprecise statements of some ideal expression, 
is dismissed by Wittgenstein as a kind of superstition. He is 
critical of the idea that there is a single standard of exactness 
to which all things, be they concepts, rules of inference, or 
empirical measurements, must conform ("We eliminate 
misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it 
may look as if we were moving towards a particular state, a state
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of complete exactness; and as If this were the real goal of our 
investigation." P.I. 91).
Now, the first of Wittgenstein's arguments puts aesthetic 
concepts - or blurred concepts generally - on an equal footing with 
the concepts that find expression in language generally. The
difference between aesthetic language (aesthetic concepts) and the
'rest of language' is a difference in degree rather than a 
difference in kind. One author, Sabina Lovibond (in Realisjn and 
Imagination in Ethics), describes this move as a 'levelling out' of 
the concepts in language: no area of language, e.g., scientific
language, is granted superiority over another. No form of 
expression, e.g., the empirical, fact-stating proposition, is
allowed to accupy centre stage in the theory of language, (And, of 
course, by parity no areas of language, e.g., aesthetic or ethical 
language, is inferior to another, nor are any forms of expression, 
e.g., the aesthetic judgement, peripheral to language...) This 
argument, however, leaves open the possibility that the greater 
part of natural language is irreparably flawed, that the vagueness 
of concepts is a shortcoming. On this view the levelling out of the 
concepts in language brings about a lowering of respectable 
concepts rather than an elevation of aesthetic concepts; if there 
is no distinction between aesthetic concepts on the one hand and 
the run of concepts on the other then the 'bad reputation*, so to 
speak, of aesthetic concepts must infect other concepts: all must 
be tarred with same brush. The second of Wittgenstein's arguments 
seeks to forestall this line of thought. The argument has two
55.
aspects. On the one hand there Is an argument that denies that 
exactitude and precision is necessary in all contexts. Just as it 
is not always necessary to take a hammer to a nut so it is not 
always necessary to strive after the greatest exactitude 
conceivable, Says Wittgenstein: "Am I inexact when I do not give
our distance from the sun to the nearest foot, or tell a joiner the 
width of table to the nearest thousandth of an inch?" (P.I. 88). 
On the other hand a reductio argument is employed against the idea 
that there is an absolute standard of exactitude against which 
things may be measured. For it is, after all, only as compared 
with a transcendental standard of exactness that everyday concepts 
can come to seem imprecise and approximate. Parallels may 
immediately be seen between this idea and the idea that there is 
one absolute conception of reality to which all authority is 
arrogated. For the idea that there is one standard of exactness 
entails that there is one thing against which all statements may be 
measured for exactness. And this one thing is the way the world is 
in itself. Exactness, on this view, means 'degree of
correspondance with the way things really are'. Wittgenstein 
signally fails to endorse this view when he asks what something's 
being exact can mean other than that it achieves its purpose 
effectively. He does not, that is, say that something's being 
exact means that it corresponds with the way the world really is.
There are, then, three arguments in support of the view that 
the 'blurred concepts' of aesthetics are not, because blurred, at a 
disadvantage. Discussion of the first argument, that aesthetic
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concepts do not constitute a special case, I shall postpone for the 
moment.
The idea that language might be too vague to execute the 
tasks with which it is charged implies that language and the tasks 
it executes can be prised apart. Language, on this account, has a 
certain function: thus it is possible for language to fall in
regard to this function. The function of language turns out to be 
to facilitate the communication of thoughts or private perceptions, 
i.e., to enable men to talk to one another about themselves and
about the world. That is to say that language on this view is a
device used by men to overcome the barriers that exist between
minds - or it is an instrument that allows those barriers to be 
penetrated with greater success and with greater accuracy than
other means of communication such as gestures or facial 
expressions. Thus the idea that a term in natural language may be 
too vague is an expression of the belief in a pre-linguistic 
experience of the world and of the self onto which language is 
skilfully grafted.' (Note the extent of the parallel between this 
idea and the idea, explored at the close of the last chapter, that 
the structure of sense-experience is pre-linguistic. ) And if 
language is poorly grafted onto experience it will not achieve its 
purpose. Words will produce, once through the interpersonal 
barrier, a distorted picture. Real communication will be 
Jeopardized. Men will be unable to establish clear efficient 
communication.
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It Is easy to see bow such ideas may arise. We often talk, 
for example, of attempting to express ourselves, of being lost for 
words, of failing in practice to realize our intentions. And It 
may seem as though we have within us a nugget of meaning awaiting 
expression, or a sense for which we cannot find the appropriate 
words, or an intention which we are unable to realize^^ - each of 
these existing in the mind as, on one view of sculpture, the statue 
exists within the stone, waiting to be hewn out. Or, if we are 
recounting an experience, we may feel that the point of our 
narrative is to get across what our experience was like. And we 
think; these people hear only my words', but my experience is hidden 
behind the words - my words simply cannot convey the 
phenomenological character of the experience. Therefore language 
falls short of the ideal, language fails us.
Wittgenstein opposes this way of thinking on a number of 
fronts, and some of these have been encountered already. I want 
here to highlight just one aspect of Wittgenstein's thought. It 
relates directly to the idea that some area of language, if not 
language in general, might have a purpose other than the one that 
it happens to be fulfilling. According to Wittgenstein this is 
just not possible for language that is working. (Language that is 
not working serves no purpose other than to confuse people,) The 
idea here is summed up by the assertion - to be found somewhere in 
the Investigations - that words, too, are deeds^^. That is to say 
that words are doings. Language is inextricably bound up with 
human activities and cannot be counted a phenomenon apart from
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those activities. Language, says Wittgenstein, is woven into the 
fabric of human life. It is incorporated organically into human 
activity. It is not tagged on mechanically. .. A word is not unlike
a gesture: it is a move in a language game, a recognized sign, a
doing or a deed. To suppose, therefore, that a concept can fall
short of its target is to fail to perceive the fact that a concept,
when It is doing a job, when it has a role to play within an
activity, when it counts as a valid move in the game, is no more or 
less than its role; it cannot fall short because there is no 
'super-role* that it must conform to and no *absolute-purpose' that 
it must fulfill. (That is not to deny that concepts may be
sharpened in particular circumstances to serve a particular
purpose, This is just like adding rules to a game - however, rules
will be added to a game only when the game is not playable by the 
existing rules. Analogously, the addition of new concepts into, 
say, science occurs when the enterprise cannot continue with just 
the old concepts...> Language evolves along with the activities 
into which it is woven. It could be said, even, that linguistic 
expressions are subject to a process of natural selection. A 
flawed concept is analogous to an animal not fitted to its niche in 
the environment: the animal (that is, the species) either adapts or 
it dies. Likewise, an expression not fitted to its role either 
changes radically - that is to say takes on an different role - or 
it ceases, to play a part in the language-game. Either way the 
expression is indivisible from the function that it fulfills.
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The idea that 'blurred* or 'loose' expressions fall short of 
some requirement is vulnerable, also, to the question: Why, if our 
present language is flawed, isn't it improved? Why isn't it 
systematically brought up to scratch? How would such a programme 
proceed? Says Wittgenstein: "When I talk about language (words, 
sentences, etc,) I must speak the language of every day. Is this 
language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say? 
Then how Is another one to he constructed? And how strange that we 
should be able to do anything at all with the one we have!" (P. I. 
120), Moreover, is it really feasible that a language manufactured 
in the laboratory - a test-tube language so to speak - could 
withstand the wear and tear of actual use?
The reductio argument should, I think, be approached via a 
certain route. It should, in particular, be viewed in the context 
of the discussion that leads up to it^^. It is to be borne in mind 
that Wittgenstein is discussing a conception of language that 
stands in opposition to that instanced by Augustine in the 
Confessions, He has compared uses of language to games (rather 
than calculi of rules) as early as section 7: "We can also think of 
the whole process of using words,..as one of those games by means 
of which children learn their native language. I will call these 
games 'language-games' and will sometimes speak of a primitive 
language as a language-game...I shall also call the whole, 
consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 
'language-game'". He extends the game-metaphor for another fifty- 
odd sections, criticizing along the way elements of the rival
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conception. Then, at section 65, he reaches one of those 'nodes' 
that punctuate part I of the Investigations, where the strands of 
thought are drawn together. He says: "Here we come up against the 
great, question that lies behind all these considerations. - .For 
someone might object against me; 'You take the easy way out! You 
talk about all sorts of language-games, but have no-where said what 
the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is 
common to all these activities, and what makes them into language 
or parts of language.'" Thus the considerations of fifty-odd 
sections condense into a question about the definition of a 
concept. Wittgenstein continues to be absorbed by this objection 
for some time, seeking to allay fears that an uncircumscribed 
concept is not a concept at all, and that a concept that is not 
everywhere bounded by rules is nonetheless a concept with as good a 
burden of meaning as any other (see, e.g., Investigations 69-89). 
He then moves into a discussion of why it should be supposed that a 
concept must be governed by definite rules. He argues that 
concepts not crfcumscribed at all points by rules still have a 
sense; and then he asks how it is supposed that rules govern the 
sense of a concept. How do rules secure the meaning of a concept? 
Aren't rules open to different interpretations? What gives the 
rules their sense? Thus there is a clear link between the 
sections on following a rule and the issue of whether it matters 
that a concept cannot be defined.
So Wittgenstein, arguing first that language is not, when you 
really look at it, a formal structure of concepts and rules of
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application, at length asks: what if this were the correct account 
of language? How is it supposed to operate? How does it account 
for concept-application? Thus the reductio argument is a final 
attempt to break down resistance to the very idea of family-
resemblance concepts. It is within this context that the rule-
following considerations must be seen. Viewed as objections to the 
idea that a concept must have a strict definition in order to be 
Intelligible they have a direct bearing on the issue of aesthetic 
concepts. For these concepts are perceived to suffer from
vagueness, and Wittgenstein expressly states that here are concepts 
that cannot be formalized. The attempt to show that such concepts 
especially are legitimate involves undermining the conception of 
meaning and understanding that underpins faith in sharp concepts. 
Wittgenstein says, in effect, that the only reason loose concepts 
are considered with suspicion, or not even countenanced in 
philosophy, is because other concepts are thought to rest on a
firmer foundation. Wittgenstein questions the basis of this belief 
and finds it wanting. The drift of his argument, and its general 
relevance to 'loose concepts' may be illustrated as follows. Since 
Wittgenstein's arguments are centred about the idea of seeing what 
is common and of expanding an arithmetical number series it will be 
expedient to develop an easy parallel between these on the one hand 
and aesthetic concepts on the other.
Imagine, then, the following three variations on a parlour 
guessing-game. 113 An arithmetical series is developed number by
number and the participants have to determine what the next number
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will be=7. Thus the series 1, 5, 11, 19 will elicit the response
'29'. [2] A number of objects is named one after another and the
participants have to say what the objects have in common. Thus 
'pillar-box', 'fire-engine', and 'poppy' will elicit the response 
'red'. C3] The common element is to be identified between things 
that include abstract names and concepts. Thus 'Poland', 'Georges 
Sand', and 'Death March' will elicit the response 'Chopin'. The 
game could be called, à la Wittgenstein, 'seeing what is common'.
Variations C13 and C33 of the game are of particular interest here,
tIthough [2] is important as a bridge between the two. (It seems I
Iclear, in fact, that no line could be drawn between one variation I
and the next. ) Now, it should be obvious that when we seek a |
definition of a concept such as 'elegant' or 'sensitive' we are j
engaged in an activity very closely akin to the third variation of |
the 'seeing-what-is-common' game. We could, for example, play |
variation C33 with the following objects in mind: 'an elegant |
string-quartet', 'an elegant necklace', 'an elegant motor-car |
dashboard' , and so on. (Perhaps we should have to be more !
specific, and .ask for what was common between this elegant string i
quartet and this elegant necklace, etc. And we could either I
tpresent the items there and then or we could refer to examples of 
these things with which everyone was familiar. ) And in this case 
we should be looking to see what was common between various 
instances of elegance.
It could be said, therefore, that when we look for a 
definition of a concept such as 'elegant' we are engaged in an
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activity strictly analogous to seeking the formula of, or the 
regularity in, a number series, In the case of the number-series 
the importance of discovering the formula (seeing what is common) 
lies in the fact that the series can be expanded correctly (the 
common element may be repeated). In the case of the concept the 
Importance of discovering the common element lies in the fact that 
the concept can be applied correctly to new cases. 'Seeing what is 
common' allows the sense in each case.to be preserved: the number- 
series remains the same series and the concept continues to be the 
same concept. Now while it is an undeniable fact that 'seeing what 
is common' is an extremely important learning technique (thus do we 
discover the regularities of cause and effect. Thus, too, do we 
pick up on the meaning of many of the signs around us: if I see
that traffic always stops at a red light I shall sucpcse the red 
light to be a command/request to stop. And so on) a metaphysical 
importance comes, by and by, to be attached to seeing what Is
common. The common element seems to express the sense of the
number series on the one hand and the concept on the other. The
sense of each, the pure precipitate of meaning, is distilled in the 
common factor. And it seems that when we expand the number-series 
or when we apply the concept we ensure that we are proceeding 
correctly by ensuring that we remain true to the pure sense that we 
have in the form of the formula or the definition.
Consider the expansion of the number-series. Suppose we are 
attempting to teach someone the meaning of the instruction 'add 2'. 
It is possible that someone may understand by 'add 2' what we
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should call the instruction 'add 2 until the 1000th digit and then 
add 4'. Or, if we have demonstrated the operation '+2' with 
numbers of 1000 and more, our pupil might understand by '+2' the
operation 'add 2 until the millionth digit and then add 4', or 'add
2 only if number does not contain the sequence 216; otherwise add 
4' , etc. Ve shall say that this person has not understood the 
meaning of the operation '+2'. But what is it to grasp the meaning 
of '+2'? It is not adequate to say that meaning of '+2' is given 
by what is common between each number in the series. For that is 
consistent with an operation that allows correct expansion of the 
series up to a certain point followed by incorrect expansion. Or 
it is consistent with an operation that allows correct extension of 
all numbers but prime numbers, or all numbers but numbers 
containing the sequence '216', or whatever. I.e., what is common 
between the numbers of any finite series of numbers is not entirely 
determined by the series as it stands. So what does grasping the 
principle '+2' consist in? The idea that Wittgenstein opposes is
expressed most clearly not by Wittgenstein but by John McDowell-'®:
it is the idea that to understand the meaning of 't2' is to engage 
mental cogwheels with a set of rails, a pre-existing sense, and to 
allow these rails to determine the expansion of the series under 
'+2'. To understand 't2* as we should understand ' t2 until the 
1000th digit and then +4* or ' +2 only if number does not contain
sequence 216...etc' would be to engage the mental mechanism with 
the f^ong set of rails. Wittgenstein's own metaphor is that of a 
machine which executes a particular set of movements. We imagine 
that the machine carries, somehow, all its possible movements with
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it. The machine, once it is in motion, carries out the same 
operation time and time again. It is, says Wittgenstein, Just such 
a picture that we have of the mind applying a formula; there is the 
machine and its invariable movement, always the same, and there is 
the formula and its consistent application, which again is always 
the same; going on in the same way seems to be tied as Intimately 
to the formula as the movement of the machine is to the machine. 
The machine might churn out bottletops or press vinyl records. The 
formula churns out successive numbers in a series.
These metaphors express the feeling we have that the formula 
leaves no choice about what comes next - we apply the formula 
without any hesitation, we know exactly how to interpret It, But 
what guides us in this interpretation? How can something like an 
arithmetical formula, or some other representation of the sequence 
of differences, guide us in the expansion of the series? As 
Vitgenstein says: how can something that we grasp in a flash accord 
or fail to accprd with the use, which is extended in time? 
Whatever we grasp in a flash can be put to different uses. That is 
to say that a rule rests on no more firm a foundation than the 
practice itself. How do I know how to go on? Because I know the 
rule that governs the expansion of the series. And how do I know 
how to follow the rule? I simply follow it,.. "There is a way of 
grasping the rule which is not an interpretation and which is 
exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' 
in actual cases." (P.I. 201). Having grasped the rule is being 
able to proceed correctly.
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Therefore, expressions of the rule - e.g., the formula, the 
definition - rest on no more firm a foundation than the rule
itself. The formula cannot ground knowledge. Understanding a
concept need not Involve grasping something like a definition (the 
definition is, after all, a formalization of the .practice).
The objection might persist; "But still, it is surely true 
that an ill-defined or vague concept cannot hold a determinate 
place in a discussion. No-one knows quite what it means. It is 
impossible to pin it down and subject it to rational scrutiny.
Reason cannot get a hold on it." But of course the whole issue is 
precisely about what it is to know what something means.
Certainly, it may be a sign that someone knows what something means
that he can give a definition. Giving a definition, that is, may 
be a manifestation of knowledge. And giving a definition may be % 
succinct way of transmitting knowledge - witness the efficacy, on 
the whole, of the dictionary - but still that is not to say that 
knowledge is guided by or secured, by a definition. For you must 
know what to do with the definition once you have it. (Relevant 
here, too, is the fact that knowing something and being able to 
express what you know are different things...)
The blurredness of the concepts in ethics and aesthetics, 
then, is not a sign of their infirmity, nor, for that matter, of 
their 'subjectivity*. It is as though Wittgenstein, having pointed 
out that much of language behaves in a much freer manner than might 
be supposed, turns to ethics and aesthetics as the places where
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this is particularly apparent. (He could perhaps have said that 
one way of freeing yourself from the urge to think of language as a 
calculus with fixed rules would be to examine the concepts of 
ethics and aesthetics; for there a true melting-pot of concepts may 
be observed. ) Thus Wittgenstein may be read as turning the usual 
conception of language - which places precise fact-stating 
discourse at the centre and aesthetics and ethics on the periphery 
- on its head.
I said earlier that I would consider some of the similarities 
between aesthetic concepts and concepts of a less controversial 
kind. In what follows I hope to narrow the gap between aesthetic 
concepts on the one hand and more pedestrian concepts on the other 
by considering similarities in the way in which these concepts 
enter into rational discussion.
Ill
A few precise rules suffice to 'fix' the concept 'prime 
number* . It is for this reason that a computer may be programmed 
to discriminate between prime and non-prime Integers. The rules 
that fix a concept such as 'intelligent', on the other hand, are 
neither few nor precise (thus it's arguable whether the concept 
'intelligent' is fixed). We could certainly write down a 
provisional list of abilities or qualities that we think an 
Intelligent man ought to possess. Of this list some abilities will
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rank more highly than others. I may, for example, rank the ability 
to play chess or do crossword puzzles more highly than the ability 
to speak a foreign language; or I may rank the ability to sight- 
read music more highly than the ability to whistle a remembered 
melody. So I shall be more ready to call a man intelligent who can 
play chess and do crossword puzzles, or who can sight-read music, 
than a man who can speak a foreign language, or who can whistle a 
remembered melody. We can say very generally that someone who has 
mastery of a number of diverse and difficult intellectual skills is 
entitled to be called intelligent: our list will undoubtedly
contain a number of such skills, e.g., the ability to write poetry, 
to sight-read music, to calculate efficiently, and so forth. But 
no one item on our list will be sufficient for intelligence, nor is 
it likely that any one item will be necessary. A mathematical 
prodigy who cannot spell or string two sentences together is not 
intelligent. And if someone cannot play chess, or cannot do jj
crossword puzzles, he may still be entitled to be called |iIintelligent on the basis of other aptitudes which he
Idisplays/skills that he has. I
i
11An insight into the 'informal logic' of the concept j
i'intelligent' may be obtained by thinking how an argument |
concerning an application of it might arise, proceed, and - perhaps i
- be resolved. Suppose, e.g., I .am challenged over the assertion 1
that the man is more intelligent who can play chess and solve I
1crossword puzzles than the man who can speak a foreign language. I :
may seek to justify my position by arguing that playing chess and
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solving crossword-puzzles have more affinities with other 
intelligent-making activities than has speaking a second language. 
Thus I might try to draw parallels between puzzle-solving and 
chess-playing on the one hand and abstract reasoning and 
mathematical ability on the other. And I may suggest that playing 
chess and solving crossword puzzles involve an intellectual 
creativity, concentration, and resourcefulness not required of the 
speaker of a second language. These last concepts may forge a link 
between puzzle-solving and chess-playing on the one hand and other 
intelligent-making skills on the other.
Note, however, that the concepts 'resourcefulness', 
'creativity', 'intellectual versatility' do not strictly define the 
concept 'intelligent', They stand, rather, in roughly the same 
relation to the concept 'intelligent' as the concepts 
'picturesque', 'elegant', 'fine' stand to the concept 'beautiful'. 
That is to say that they are no more amenable to crisp definition 
than the original concept. So how might they advance my argument? 
Does the mention of creativity and resourcefulness and intellectual 
versatility achieve anything more then the piling up of one vague 
term upon another?
Consider that these concepts - 'intellectual 
resourcefulness', 'creativity', 'concentration' - and others will 
form, along with 'intelligent', what might be called a concept- 
clique Cor, in more overtly Wittgensteinian terms, a family of 
concepts); they are related to or associated with one another.
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They tend to give one another support. Although they are by no 
means equivalent in meaning they sometimes (in some contexts) 
approach synonomy. Sometimes they differ from one another only 
slightly, so that, mentioned in the same breath, they alter one 
another's meaning ever so slightly. It seems to me that music 
offers a good metaphor for the way in which these concepts work. A 
cocept may be compared to a scale of notes. Different notes 
represent different senses or applications of the concept. An 
'adjacent concept' - i.e., a close relative in the family of
concepts - may consist of a number of the same and a number of 
different notes (just as different scales have notes in common).
Thus the concept 'intelligent' may, depending upon the context, 
cover anything from the behaviour of African Grey parrots to the 
thought of men like Einstein and Shakespeare. The concept 
'creative', however, may not stretch to cover the behaviour of 
African Grey parrots in any context (and this is not because the |Iparrots are not creative in the way that they are not yellow - it |i
is just that the concept 'creative' has no place in talk about j
parrots) though it undoubtedly covers cases like Einstein or "!
Shakespeare. Thus the concepts 'intelligent' and 'creative' share |
some applications - they have some notes or tones in common - but j
differ markedly in others. And Just as extremely complex patterns I
may be created in music so extremely complex effects may be 
achieved through careful juxtaposition of concepts. Deploying a f
number of concepts in a particular context will be like playing a i
series of motes: each note takes on colour according to the notes j
before and after it, which is to say that its meaning in a piece of |
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music is more than its meaning alone®®. Thus a concept may be
vague when considered in the abstract and without companions - here 
it is vague in the same way that a single note is vague. The note 
belongs to no key in particular and has no 'direction* - there is 
no movement in the ' music' at this point. But ,if more notes are 
played the music begins to move in a certain direction, a key is 
established, and the note occupies a significant place in the 
musical structure. Likewise, as concepts are deployed they 
interact with one another, and the sense begins to emerge like the 
direction, mood, and meaning of a piece of music.
The idea may be expressed diagramatically. (See Appendix I.)
The strategic deployment of various 'loose concepts' may 
little by little restrict the feasible compass of a dispute. Each 
loose concept will extend over .a range of paradigm cases. Thus the 
concept 'creative' may encompass the activity of a poet, a mother, 
an entrepreneur each of these might count as anchoring a key 
application of the concept 'creative' (a different note in the 
scale). The concept 'intellectual versatility* may encompass the 
virtues of a philosopher, a politician, a chat-show host. As more 
and more concepts are deployed the area where they can be said to 
overlap may diminish (just as the more discrete points there are on 
a graph the better the curve that can be drawn). As the musical 
metaphor brings out, one concept may amplify another, or slightly 
modify it, or be played off against it, and so forth. And as in
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music the 'colourings' available, which is to say the nuances of 
meaning available, are diverse and multiple.
It may seem that to explicate the logic of these loose 
concepts by means of metaphor - and a musical one at that - is to 
use the opaque to clarify the unclear. Isn't it the very nature of 
such things as musical expression and meaning that are in question 
here? Vhat understanding is gained of aesthetic discourse if it is 
compared with the mysterious processes of music? It is here that 
the Aristotle's injunction against the pursuit of more clarity than 
is feasible is relevant^*. The point of the musical metaphor is to 
suggest that meanings do not accumulate mechanically, but are like 
flavours, which interact extremely subtly and with great
sensitivity to the immediate environment. The further question: 
But how does that work? is out of place: the process is subtle, and 
that is the whole point. When it is appreciated how instinctive 
and complex are the workings of language the desire to capture 
everything in formulae and rules will fade. In any case, two
Important points have emerged from the discussion thus far: first,
it has been demonstrated that although a loose concept such as 
'intelligent' cannot be strictly defined, it is nonetheless governed 
by conditions; second, an insight has been gained into how concepts 
act upon one another and generate extremely rich and varied
meanings. Something more will be said concerning this in the next 
chapter. The question now is whether there are any condition-
governed aesthetic terms.
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An example of a condition-governed aesthetic term is 
'understatement'. Obviously, we cannot give a list oï necessary- 
and-sufficient conditions which a piece of understated writing must 
meet. A definition of this sort would have to take into account 
the subject matter and the range of reactions , appropriate to it; 
the fine nuances of meaning conveyed by felicitous placing of 
words, phrases, punctuation; and so forth. (It is unlikely that 
the definition: 'Understatement is a style of writing in which the
dramatic and important is stressed less than would have been 
expected...' would satisfy Anne Sheppard.) But is the terra 
condition-governed at all? Are there no circumstances in which it 
may be said to be incorrect to describe something as 'understated'? 
Is it possible, for example, to say that The Sun newspaper employs 
understatement in its leader articles? Wouldn't such an ascription 
be totally incorrect? And if it is incorrect to say of The Sun 
that it's reporting is understated (or, for that matter, 
restrained, balanced, objective) may it not also be incorrect to 
say the same of, e.g., a poem? For the question whether the 
emotion expressed in a work of art is understated may be a very 
significant aesthetic question. For instance, a reader who 
considers the stories of Chekov dull may be brought to a wholly 
different understanding when it Is pointed out that in Chekov there 
is a great deal of drama beneath the surface of the narrative. 
Someone who fails to perceive the ..understatement In Chekov has 
simply misunderstood him, has made an error of judgement no less 
clear than if he had attributed restraint or understatement to the 
leader-writers of The Sun. So the concept of understatement,
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without doubt an. important aesthetic term, is condition-governed in 
some sense.
But what if the reader of The Sun insists that, for him, the 
newspaper is understated? Shouldn't we say that, he is not free to 
maintain this? For then, we should argue, all political speeches, 
propaganda, and factual reports are understated, or restrained, no 
matter what language they are couched in - and this is patently 
untrue. I.e., if The Sun is understated and restrained then 
virtually everything else is too. To say that the term 
'understatement' or 'restraint' or 'balance' can be applied 
correctly to The Sun newspaper would be to destroy, wholesale, all 
the distinctions that we are accustomed to drawing between styles 
of reporting. The Sun is, we might say, an exemplar of what we 
mean when we say that a piece of reporting is not restrained, 
balanced, understated. Ve might say: This, and things like this,
is what we mean by unrestrained partisan reporting*'.
So here is at least one condition-governed aesthetic term. 
And, of course, there are many more. Aesthetic concepts share the 
indeterminate logic of many other concepts in language. Thus 
something stronger than an analogy can be drawn between the way in 
which many faraily-resemblance concepts extend to cover various 
cases and the way in which aesthetic terms extend to cover various 
cases*'^. Something may be said here, then, about Anne Sheppard's 
requirement; that it be shown how aesthetic judgements relate to 
factual judgements, how they can be compared, supported. Justified,
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and so forth. The relation between an aesthetic term and a factual 
judgement is not well-described as one where the factual judgement 
is first on the scene and the aesthetic judgement comes along 
later. Often, as with 'understatement* and The Sun, the aesthetic 
concept is learned in the presence of and with the aid of examples 
or instances. Therefore, the aesthetic concept is not taught in 
the form: anything that fits this factual description can also be 
called 'elegant', 'understated', etc. It is taught in the form: 
this, and things like this, are elegant... And so forth.
However, a dischordant note is struck, it seems, by the
observation that aesthetic concepts pack an evaluative punch in 
addition to a descriptive one. In other words, normal concepts
just describe the world, while aesthetic concepts both describe and 
evaluate it. The non-cognitivist may seek to press this 
distinction in something like the following way,
Suppose that I have two coffee-mugs before me. One is 
taller, more slender, less angular than the other. From such
description we might be inclined to say that the tall mug is more 
elegant than the other. But, of course, as with 'understatement', 
we are not logically bound to say this. Ve might say that the 
elegance of the mug is 'loosely entailed* by its height, width, 
proportions, and shape. And that would be to say that these
features count towards the elegance of the mug but do not strictly
entail its elegance. I.e., an object may be elegant and lacking 
these features, or it may have these features and still not be
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elegant (think what makes a mug elegant and what makes a string- 
quartet or a mathematical proof elegant). But if the mug is 
elegant it is in virtue of these and similar features. Now, it is 
important that were I to ask someone else to hazard a guess at 
which of the mugs I thought most elegant he would in all likelihood 
identify the tall thin mug. We could imagine him saying: ' If
either of the mugs can be called elegant - and it's an open 
question whether either of them really is elegant - then it is the 
tall thin mug'.
Now consider a slightly different case. I think the tall 
thin mug 'elegant'. But my companion, thinking the mug too tall 
and too thin, describes it as 'etiolated' . Now one account of our 
disagreement might be that I perceive the slimness of the first mug 
and, finding the impression agreeable, choose the word 'elegant' to 
describe it. This term suggests the major features of the mug - 
its height and its thinness - as well as the positive attitude that 
I have towards it. Hy companion aknowledges the slimness too, but, 
finding the impression disagreeable, chooses the term 'spindly' or 
'etiolated' to describe it. This terra also suggests the major 
features of the mug - its height and its slimness - as well as the 
negative attitude of my companion. Both the terra 'elegant' and the 
term 'etiolated' are entailed, in the loose way suggested above, by 
the height, width, proportions and ..shape of the coffee-mug. But 
the looseness of the entallment accomodates contrary evaluations.
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We may be inclined, therefore, to say that these aesthetic 
terras communicate two things: first, something about the world (the 
mug is correctly characterized as tall and slim); second, something 
about the observer/evaluator (the mug is, agreeable to one but not 
to the other). Thus aesthetic terms, dr terms in their aesthetic 
use, may be said to have two 'dimensions' or strands. The first is 
a fact-stating dimension. The second is an emotive dimension. The 
two may be peeled apart. The terms 'elegant' and 'etiolated' may 
both identify the same salient features of the mug, but they 
signal different attitudes towards these features.
Now, on this assumption, it is plain that the terms 'elegant' 
and 'etiolated', in so far as they communicate something about the 
world (in so far as they are condition-governed), can be said to 
be, within reason, true or false. For suppose that we show a third 
party the two mugs, and he says that he believes our dispute to be 
about the squat mug. We should in such a situation want to know 
how on earth the terms 'etiolated' and 'elegant' may be applied to 
the squat mug. We' should say that, even on the assumption that -a 
purely evaluative element enters into the choice of the terms 
'elegant' and 'etiolated', there is enough descriptive content to 
make some ascriptions of elegance or etiolation quite ridiculous 
and inadmissible (in precisely the same way that a description of 
The Sun newspaper as restrained and understated is both ridiculous 
and inadmissible).
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So: evaluative terms can be shown to have, at the least, a
descriptive aspect. It is surely not possible to apply the term 
'elegant', without qualification, to anything at all. The great 
majority of ascriptions of elegance wi. 11 undoubtedly be 
intelligible - ' I can see what you mean' - though some will elicit 
the response: 'I can't see that- at all'. Certain applications of 
the term will amount to a misuse of the concept. And whether a 
misuse has occurred will be determined by other competent users of 
the language. I cannot just say; 'Veil, I think it's elegant, even 
if no-one else does; ray feelings on the matter are 
incontrovertable' . In such a situation it may be suggested to me 
that I use another term to express my admiration or my liking. If, 
for example, I have said that I think the Tay Rail Bridge 'elegant' 
I may be persuaded to accept the terra 'imposing' instead. I may be 
told: 'Whatever you see in the bridge it can't properly be called 
elegance; if the Tay Rail Bridge is elegant then The Sun newspaper 
is restrained and objective. . . ' (The Tay Rail Bridge is, we might 
say, too far off the paradigm cases of elegance to sit easily under 
that expression). I may, however, eventually build some elegance- 
making features (terms from the elegance-clIque or family) around 
my description of the bridge, suggesting perhaps that the structure 
is 'majestically imposing, spare and unostentatious, etc, etc.' 
These concepts will not go against a thing's being elegant, and 
could in some circumstances lead quite directly to a thing's being 
called elegant, but they will be concepts more at home than is 
'elegant' with other concepts that might apply to the bridge; e.g., 
'stolid', 'monumental', 'spartan', 'functional', etc.
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However, such modification may only proceed so far. There 
will come a point where the most significant features of an object 
will sit easily with a range of decrlptlve terms at my disposal. 
And the idea (already mentioned) that now comes to the fore is that 
I can use the decriptive terms available to me to express a range 
of evaluations - for it surely cannot be that the only terms I am 
left with to describe an object are terms allowing only one 
evaluation.
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Chapter Three.
The suggestion to which this chapter is addressed is that 
aesthetics has to do with the disposition of the will. Aesthetic 
concepts express, at least in part, dispositions of the will. 
Here, it is argued, lies the greatest difference between aesthetic 
concepts and concepts such as 'red* and 'sour'. The considerations 
of the previous chapter have, according to the non-cognitivist, 
shown only that some of the features of aesthetic activity are 
governed by conditions; but it has not been shown that aesthetic 
judgements are wholly condition-governed. The non-cognitivist will 
admit that some aesthetic judgements are indeed inadmissible - but 
this is because such judgements will indicate conceptual 
incompetence rather than because the judgement, the evaluation 
itself, is incorrect.
The present chapter, then, develops and illustrates a number 
of the ideas introduced in the last chapter. For there it was 
suggested that aesthetic concepts, no less than other concepts, are 
governed by conditions. That the conditions under which a concept 
applies cannot be neatly formalized (as is the case with most 
aesthetic concepts) is not to say that the concept is applied 
arbitrarily, that there is no saying when it is correctly applied, 
or when one application is more or less justified than another. 
And it was suggested that, like paints on a palette or notes in a 
scale, concepts can be deployed in such combinations as to achieve 
many and varied semantical effects. These ideas are considered
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further in this chapter. On the one hand there is Illustration, by 
way of examples, of how concepts are in fact deployed - when they 
are brought in to play, how they are used to Influence evaluation, 
to narrow range of reference, to achieve precision, and so forth.
On the other hand there is discussion of the logical relations
between the disposition of the will, i.e., the aesthetic
evaluation, and the reasons that support it. Reasons, I shall 
argue, support a Judgement of value in virtue of the fact that they 
provide a criterion of the evaluation in question. This view
stands opposed to the view that a reason supports an evaluation t
only in the sense that the reason specifies what it is that is 
being coupled with a pro-attitude to yield the evaluation. The 
former view says that the nature of my liking for, say, Shakespeare 
is indicated by the reasons I shall give: my reasons express my j
evaluation. The latter view says that it is what I like about j
Shakespeare that is indicated by my reasons: my reasons report ray 1I
evaluation. On the former view, if I disagree with someone's |
evaluation of aq object I do not share his particular conception of ;
it, On the latter view I do not share his pro-attitude towards it. j
The crucial difference between these views is that whereas a I
conception of things is malleable, subject to alteration in the j
light of reason (in other words it is rational - it is a part of I
rationality), a pro-attitude is intractable. On the former view 
aesthetics may be seen as a manifestation of rationality. On the ;
latter view aesthetics lies somewhere outside the sphere of 
rationality.
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The conclusion thus far (as the sceptic might be inclined to 
see it) is that aesthetic terms do indeed describe the world, but 
due to their evaluative overtones they do not describe the world 
uncontroverslally, as, e.g., colour-terms do. If I see that 
something is red I simply choose the correct term and pronounce it 
red. But if I see that something is tall and thin and if I feel 
well-disposed to the tallness and thinness in this context (in the 
context of this object) I shall choose the semi-descriptive, ssmi- 
evaluative/expressive term 'elegant'*^.
An issue implicit in an earlier discussion (pp, 31-34) comes 
to the fore here, namely, the relation between aesthetic responses 
and emotions. One of the difficulties that the non-cognitivist 
account of aesthetic value encountered before was that, on an 
account of aesthetic concepts in terms of emotional responses, to 
say 'this is elegant' seems tantamount to saying 'this gives me the 
elegant-feeling'. Attention is focussed on the feelings of the 
observer rather than on the objects under appraisal. And. feelings 
being what they are, i.e., non-cognitive, brute, essentially 
unconstrained by the real world**, it was not possible to explain 
why, in any aesthetic description (e.g., this mug is etiolated, 
indeed spindly, like a gangly adolescent,,,), one term rather than 
another is selected, and selected with such care; why aesthetic 
discussions often involve the use of very fine distinctions; why 
aesthetic disputes seem to rely upon closely reasoned arguments,
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arguments knit together by an informal logic like that found in 
everyday disputes; and so forth.
The account here outlined would appear to solve this problem. 
For to say that something is elegant is not to say that it arouses 
an elegant-feeling. It is to give a general description of the 
object - it is tall, thin, delicate, etc - in terms that express a 
positive attitude towards the object. That is to say that various 
features of aesthetic discourse - the particularity of the 
language, the logical fabric of aesthetic argument, and so on - may 
be attributed to the descriptive or fact-stating dimension of 
aesthetic language. The emotional (or affective) input need not be 
considered responsible for the complexity of aesthetic discussion. 
It need not be thought that the emotions involved are such as to 
allow skilled and detailed argument. For it can be claimed that 
when people discuss aesthetics they are discussing the 
applicability of various concepts, seeking to find those which are 
most apt in the circumstances, but ultimately different evaluations 
may be expressed according to whether, in the end, the disputants 
respond differently - have, so to speak. different emotional 
constitutions. The sceptic can, on this account, eat his cake and 
have it. To aesthetic discussion may be granted a portion of 
rationality, while the basic point - that value is non-rational 
remains unchallenged.
At the end of the last chapter I said that one account of the 
difference between the man who considers a coffee-mug elegant and
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the man who considers the same coffee-mug etiolated is that the mug 
arouses approval in the one man and disapproval in the other. This 
account stands opposed to the idea, which I favour, that one of the 
men has in fact misperceived some aspect of the mug. There is, in 
other words, no logical requirement that the mug be recognized as 
either elegant or etiolated. One man may persuade the other man to 
concur with his judgement, but this will no doubt involve 
psychological trickery - suggestion, persuasive definition, 
cajolery, and the like - rather than Instruments of rationality. 
In what follows I shall question the adequacy of this account. In 
particular I shall be looking at whether it is correct to 
characterize the means by which one man influences the evaluation 
of the other as 'psychological trickery', i.e., as essentially non- 
rational .
It would appear expedient to begin by looking a little more
closely at the nature and extent of the rationality (and
irrationality) .that is said on this account to enter into 
aesthetics. Consider, then, the following aesthetic disputes. In 
the first the question is whether the Tay Rail Bridge is elegant; 
in the second the question is whether the wine-glasses that
comprise a set of glasses are elegant. It is significant that in
the first dispute, as in disputes involving bridges generally, 
there may be a question over whether the concept 'elegant' (and its 
near-relatives) has any place at all in the description of the 
bridge. That is to say that in this discussion there is a place 
for the question whether any reasonable person - whether anyone who
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is aware of the meaning of his utterances - could call the bridge 
elegant. In the dispute over the wine-glasses, however, the 
question is whether, in particular, 'elegant', rather than 
'etiolated' or 'spindly' and the like, applies. It may be obvious 
to the disputants how the wine-glasses might be construed as 
elegant - and also how they might be construed as etiolated or 
spindly. But the question whether it is at all reasonable to apply 
the concept 'elegant' (or its near relatives) is out of place*'"". 
For wine-glasses are just the sort of things to which the concept 
'elegant' applies.
So if someone were to describe the bridge as elegant (or, 
better, 'delicate* - in the aesthetic sense of the term) we should 
say that he was mad. It would be very difficult to construe the 
bridge as either elegant or delicate - the bridge is the sort of 
thing to which we should point and say: 'Here is an example of an
object lacking in both elegance and delicacy. . . * But, as 
mentioned, there is no problem about the wine-glasses. If we were 
trying to explain to someone what 'delicate' or 'elegant' meant we 
should very likely give wine-glasses, or things like wine-glasses 
(ornaments, chandaliers, structures supported by slender stems, 
etc), as examples. Thus there is really no difficulty to the
question: Of the Tay Rail Bridge and a set of wine-glasses which is 
the more elegant or more delicate?.. The competent user of the 
language will reply that, by and large, the wine-glasses are better 
described as elegant or delicate than the Tay Rail Bridge.
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However, the question arises: when it comes to wine-glasses,
which are generally considered delicate and elegant, how do we 
decide which are the delicate and elegant among them? A huge, 
stolid, angular structure like the Tay Rail Bridge is not elegant - 
so the argument runs - because 'elegant* just does not apply to 
such structures, And it is not delicate for the same reason (see 
ch. 2, pp. 16-18). But wine-glasses are just the sort of things to 
which these concepts apply- So how can we withold these terms from 
any wine-glasses, and how can we talk intelligibly about the extent 
to which these terms apply to particular kinds of wine-glass? The 
sceptical answer is that here personal preference comes into play. 
If any wine-glass may be described as elegant, or whatever, it is 
described so under the influence of feeling. For conceptual 
competence can only be pressed so far. Beyond a certain point it 
is impossible to argue that a concept such as 'elegant* or 
'delicate' is applied rightly or wrongly. According to the
sceptical position that point is reached in a case like that of the 
wine-glasses. That wine-glass is elegant, therefore, that arouses 
a positive feeling when its elegant-making features are considered, 
(Those same features, arousing a negative feeling, would lead to 
the glass being described as etiolated or spindly and the like.)
To put this another way: reasons are brought forth for
witholding the term 'elegant* from the Tay Rail Bridge. These will 
mention the size of the bridge, its mass and solidity, its angular 
shape, its squat stolidness, and so forth. These features,
generally, run counter to elegance and its cognates. But what sort
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of reasons might justify witholding the term 'elegant' from an
inelegant (or so we think) set of wine-glasses? Is the structure
of reasoning in the latter case, in so far as we can discern it,
similar to the reasoning involved in the case of the bridge?
,According to the view under consideration there is a considerable 
difference. Reasons, on this account, may be given for witholding 
the term 'elegant' or the terra 'delicate' from the Tay Rail Bridge 
because the bridge is too far off the beaten track of elegant 
objects for the concept to be correctly applied there. But no 
reasons may be given for witholding the term from a set of wine­
glasses. For wine-glasses, at least in comparison with the bridge, 
are clear candidates for description by means of the term 'elegant' 
or by means of the term 'delicate*. So why, in the case of the 
wine-glasses, 'etiolated* or 'spindly' rather than 'elegant* is 
used is down to the ungoverned emotions of the evaluator. At this 
level, so the argument goes, no-one can reasonably question the use 
of one term rather than another. Thus, on this account, the 
rationality of an aesthetic discussion proceeds only so far. Gross 
questions - questions, we might say, of competence rather than 
taste - may be settled without much trouble. But questions of 
taste cannot be settled at all. Here, no reason is better than 
another.
The man who insists upon using a concept in the oddest of 
circumstances, then, can be said not to grasp, i.e., not to be 
competent in the use of, the concept. Such is the likely verdict 
on the man who calls the Tay Rail Bridge elegant. But the man who
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appears roughly competent in the use of aesthetic concepts can only 
ever be convicted of bad taste. He does not, that Is, fail to meet
any of the requirements of rationality. He is merely of a
different 'emotional constitution' from his fellows*^.
The story of the way in which an aesthetic term is selected, 
then, runs something like this. There are two versions. In the 
first a range of commendatory terras is considered initially. This 
excludes all terms with negative overtones. Thus, from the start, 
the positive evaluation is expressed. Now, of the commendatory
terms only a small subset will properly apply to the object under 
consideration. For example, if the object towards which I feel 
well-disposed is a bridge I can bring to the fore certain 
complimentary aesthetic terras. I could put forward a whole rash of 
these at random, e.g., 'elegant', 'impressive', 'well- 
proportioned', 'monolithic*, 'intricate', 'graceful', and so on. 
But only some of these terras will properly refer to the bridge.
Thus my expression of a positive evaluation is tempered - it may be 
better to say given direction - by the fact that many aesthetic 
terras have descriptive connotations. My evaluation, therefore, is 
yoked to a description, (In paraphrase of Dr. Johnson: the logic
of aesthetic discourse is a consequence of evaluation on the one 
hand and description on the other being 'yoked by violence 
together'.,.) In the second version a rash of aesthetic terras, 
expressing both positive and negative evaluations, is narrowed down 
initially by appeal to the normal extension of the terms. Thus the 
descriptive aspect of the concepts is involved from the outset. If
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the object of my attention is again the bridge I can tender a 
number of descriptions, e.g., 'imposing', 'unsightly*, 'inspiring*, 
'monolithic', and so on. (Note the absence of terms that do not 
easily apply, e.g., 'elegant', 'delicate', 'sensitive'.) After the 
preliminary cull there will be a range of feasible positive and 
negative terms, The final choice is made on the basis of feeling. 
Thus, once a family of concepts is identified and vetted for 
applicability, we choose between them,- supposedly, on the basis of 
which of the concepts expresses the emotional response that we 
have. The two versions of the story present essentially the same 
picture. Ultimately, the evaluation and the description take place 
in parallel, and are yoked together in the aesthetic terra. In both 
procedures rationality stops short of governing the choice of terra 
completely. [It might be worth noting that the discussion thus far 
has concentrated upon verbal description and appraisal of aesthetic 
objects. But there are more aesthetic activities than just 
describing objects and giving voice to evaluations. Actions may 
also give expression to aesthetic perceptions. The way in which I 
read (aloud) a poem, for example, will indicate the way in which I 
understand it. Likewise, the way in which I play a piece of music 
will disclose how I am inclined to view It. Therefore, we could 
say, in line with the foregoing comments about verbal iced 
judgements, that some of our actions concerning aesthetic objects 
will be condition-governed, e.g., hanging a painting on a wall 
rather than eating from it - if you eat from it you do not, it is 
to be supposed, understand what a painting is - and some actions 
will be ungoverned, e.g., hanging a painting on one wall rather
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than another, displaying it alongside these paintings rather than 
these, and so on. That is to say that it will be argued that 
reasons may be employed against eating from a painting: either
treat it as it is supposed to be treated or refrain from calling it 
a painting. But no reasons may be mobilized against hanging a
painting in one way rather than another and in one context rather 
than another.*^]
To sum up, than. Ve could say that in the case of the bridge 
conceptual competence is at issue; while in the case of the wine­
glasses taste is at issue. This is one way at least of formulating 
the view that the final arbitar between aesthetic terms in 
difficult cases is free-floating emotion, or taste. Concepts are 
held in check up to a point, but there is a wide margin in which 
personal feeling operates and is decisive. There is, then, a 
considerable shady area, where competence is not in question but 
taste is. The larger part of aesthetic activity, it is argued, 
takes place within this shady area.
But the question arises: what happens when the transition is
made between competence and taste? Does taste enter when rules
give out (however rules are to be understood, e.g., as shared norms 1
I
- an account I am inclined to favour)? Is it that taste governs |
where the rules have nothing to say? Are the rules governing i
closely-related concepts (elegant, waspish, etiolated, delicate) i
just more complex and more subtle than the rules governing very 
different concepts? Are they less clear in meaning? Is it just ‘
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that we cannot apply them with such confidence? The answer to 
these questions will have a direct bearing on the rationality of 
aesthetics.
Roughly, it is claimed that it is a matter of competence 
whether a wine-glass is to be described as more elegant than a 
bridge. But it is claimed, on the other hand, that it is a matter 
of taste, of ungoverned emotion, whether one glass is more elegant 
than another. However, whether one glass is more elegant than 
another can be construed as a matter of conceptual competence if 
the notion of competence is not unduly restricted. In fact the
sceptical account outlined above does not do justice to the 
complexity of aesthetic reasoning. When I am asked why I like 
something I may be at a loss for words. More often, however, I 
shall give reasons, point to features of the object which make it 
interesting, and so forth. Thus the picture presented by the 
sceptic does not ring true. At the very least it needs to be given 
more sophistication. Perhaps the conditions governing aesthetic 
concepts penetrate deeper than the sceptic allows. In that case a 
greater concession to the rationality of aesthetics is granted. 
For the more extensive the conditions governing the application of 
an aesthetic term the more 'sense* can be attributed to aesthi=i.ic 
discussion. Indeed, the idea that emotion enters the fine-tuning 
of choice of terms may only be maintained if a blind eye is turned 
to the true nature of aesthetic discussion or if slovenliness 
prevents the true nature of aesthetic discussion from being 
appreciated. In what follows I shall suggest that reasons - or
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issues of conceptual competence - in aesthetics do indeed extend 
further than the sceptic supposes.
II
If we are asked to indicate which, of the bridge and the 
wine-glass, is the more elegant we should invariably choose the 
glass. Ve could give reasons - the bridge is large, and elegance 
is associated with smallness, neatness, delicacy (which does not 
itself exclude large things but sits very well with small and
tfragile objects); the bridge is angular in construction, and |
elegance is commonly found in objects that exhibit grace - which {
quality involves, frequently, curves, a blurring of extremes, a i
sense of fluidity, and so forth; the bridge has a compactness and a I
functionality about it - there is no flambouyance or panache, no j
imagination, in the structure - and the lack of a little flair |1
militates against elegance; and so on. On the other hand the j
typical wine-glass is small, delicate, fragile, curved, intricate, j
etc. It is small wonder, therefore, that the wine-glass is more ÎIreadily pronounced elegant than the bridge, (This is said to be a |
question of conceptual competence. ) Note, however, that if the ;
bridge participating in the comparison were not the Tay Rail |
Bridge, but the San Francisco GoTclen., Gate Bridge, or some similar i
cable-suspension bridge (the Forth Road Bridge might serve just as 
well, or the Kessock Bridge over the Moray Firth...), we should be 
less confident in our pronouncement. For the Golden Gate is graced
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by gentle curves, by soaring metalwork, by a method of construction 
that directs attention away from the purely functional aspects of 
the structure. It is not too difficult, therefore, to make out a 
case for the elegance of the Golden Gate*'^ .
Now if asked to identify the more elegant between a pair of 
wine-glasses how should we proceed? Is it really plausible to 
suggest, as the sceptical account seems inclined to suggest, that 
we should either be stuck here or that we should settle upon the 
glass that, inexplicably, we 'warm to' most? Is this really the 
point where reasons give out? (And by reasons I mean
considerations that the general run of people will find rationally 
persuasive or acceptable.) It seems quite clear that there is in 
fact still a great deal of room for manoeuvre here, still room for 
the giving of reasons, for presenting a cogent case - still room, 
in fact, for questions of conceptual competence to arise. It is 
not unreasonable to suppose that in the case of the wine-glasses a 
procedure akin to that outlined above for the Golden Gate Bridge 
would be followed. We should favour the wine-glass that exhibits 
most clearly elegance-making qualities. Thus the more robust- 
looking of the glasses might seem too coarse, lacking delicacy and 
fragility; the more curvaceous of the glasses may well win on 
account of grace; the more visually Interesting might triumph - so 
long as it does not encrust itself in..ornament; and so forth. The 
idea that emerges is that although we might learn the concept of 
elegance in conjunction with objects such as wine-glasses (rather 
than in conjunction with bridges or mountains) we are not thereby
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forced to call all wine-glasses elegant. Ve are not thereby left 
without the means of discriminating rationally between the elegant 
and the inelegant, or the more or less elegant, amongst, what seem 
to be quintessentially elegant objects. For we do not learn the 
concept of elegance by means of wine-glasses, or one class of 
elegant objects, alone. Ve have a whole host of exemplars, from 
Artie Terns to Aphorisms, from tennis serves to avalanches. (Of 
course, these things are not elegant in their entirety. They each 
Illustrate a way in which the concept "elegant" may be exemplarlly 
applied. Thusj the wings of the Artie Tern - long, thin, scyth- 
like - are elegant; but it is the majestic descent of the avalanche 
- seen from afar, to be sure - that is elegant. ) When we come to 
determine which of two wine-glasses is the more elegant we bring 
into play our comprehensive understanding of the concept as It Is 
expressed in our exemplars. When we argue in favour of one glass 
over another we shall compare it first to this exemplar and then to 
that, vie shall seek to bring concepts from the elegance-family to 
bear (delicate, fine, graceful, slight, petite, etc), and shall to 
this end bring in another range of exemplars. Of course, this is 
not a rigorous activity. ¥e cannot prove that what we call 
elegance in the wing of an artic tern and in the movement of an 
avalanche is there to be beheld in the wine-glass. Ve can no more 
do this than prove that a given expansion of the function ’t2* goes 
on in the same way as before. For the proof rests upon no more 
firm a foundation than that of which it is a proof. (See ch. 2, 
pp. 65/66. See also Nelson Goodman on the subject of rules of 
inference in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, ch. 3 - 'The New Problem
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of Induction*.) But that Is not to say that there is no saying 
whether one object is more elegant than another, any more than it 
is to say that we cannot determine whether, in any case, tha^  
operation *t2' has been carried out correctly.
I introduced the idea that concepts in language interact like 
basic elements of music in chapter 2 in order to suggest the range 
of 'colours', nuances of meaning, available to the language-user. 
The idea is useful here, too, in order to suggest the way in which 
concepts may be extended and modified to cover new cases.
At this point, however, it might be objected that the real 
issue has not yet been confronted. The real issue is that there is 
an evaluative aspect to aesthetic concepts: aesthetic terms are
frequently terms of commendation or condemnation. To ignore this 
aspect of aesthetic talk would be to Ignore what, for some, is the 
most prominent feature of aesthetic activity*^. However much it 
may be argued that aesthetic terms are descriptive of the world, 
and however much it may be argued that aesthetic terms, no less 
than terms like 'red' and 'sour', are governed by conditions or 
criteria, and however much complexity may be attributed to 
aesthetic concepts, there is nonetheless an aspect of aesthetics 
that relates to, for want of a better term, motivation. Aesthetics 
is not just about describing objects,(although a great deal of it
is); it is about assessing whether this object goes well with that
object, whether this object is more worthy of attention than that
object, whether an object is worth bothering about at all. In
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other words aesthetics is about attitudes towards aesthetic 
objects; aesthetics, we might say, Interests itself in the 
disposition of our will^* with regard to aesthetic objects. Here, 
it is argued, lies the nub of the issue.
The original sceptical question may now re-emerge, modified 
but essentially unscathed; can we argue rationally the merits and 
demerits of aesthetic objects? What qualities are to be 
aesthetically preferred? Which objects are worth an expenditure of 
time, money, and effort? - and then how much? In short, how are we 
to dispose our will with regard to aesthetic objects? Conceptual 
competence, it is argued, is not the issue here. Knowing how to 
use a concept no more tells you how to align your will than knowing 
how to multiply tells you how (to what end) you are to employ your 
multiplicative skills. The discussion up till now has concentrated 
upon the extent to which we are obliged to describe objects In this 
way or that. But it has failed to address the issue of how we are 
to dispose our will with regard to these objects. The question of 
how objects are to be evaluated, since it is not governed by 
logical conditions, is, it is argued, to be referred to individual 
taste, to personal preference,
One author, Peter Klvy, in a raonogr.aph called Speaking of 
Art, suggests that aesthetic dispute, does in the end come down to 
personal preference, to Issues of individual taste, but Insists 
that the important fact is where and when in a discussion this 
point is reached. This, I suppose, is designed to indicate that an
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impasse may only be accepted as such once the Issue has been 
thrashed out, and both parties are sure that their difference rests 
upon a genuine inequality of taste rather than a misperception of 
the issue by one of the two parties^^ . Thus, a dispute over the 
merits of Chekov has not come to rest on an issue of taste if one 
of the disputants insists that Chekov is dull because he is 
Interested only in small details of Russian life, that his writings 
are simple tales of garden-parties and unruffled aristocratic
society, and so on. For this claim rests upon a misperception of 
Chekov. But, of course, discovering that Chekov involves an almost 
subliminal drama may not lead the critic to revise his opinion of 
Chekov - he might just reformulate his objection, reformulate the 
expression of his taste: he might say that he has discovered, via 
Chekov, that he likes his drama to be out in the open,
ostentatious, Wagnurlan and romantic. But isn't it now clear that 
the discussion has entered a different dimension? I.e., the issue 
can no longer be said to be an insular aesthetic issue. The
discussion now is over the merits and demerits of, say, romantic 
passion in art (and life) as against, say, classical reserve. Or 
the dispute may now be traceable to general philosophical
(political? moral?) differences. Thus the issue of aesthetic 
preference will very likely draw very broad Issues into the 
reckoning. Is the stance taken on these issues also dictated by 
personal preference, by ungoverned taste?
I shall leave this question for the moment. (But I shall 
have something to say on the issue presently. For the moment I
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refer back to the first chapter, which touched upon a global 
scepticism about values in human affairs.) It is here necessary 
only to note that the disposition of the will with regard to 
particular objects - paintings, colour-schemes, hairstyles, wine­
glasses - is not independent of the disposition of the will in 
general; or, to put that another way, the disposition of the will 
in general is reflected in, expressed in, the particular Judgement.
The aesthetic assessment, therefore, cannot realistically be 
seen as a mysteriously disembodied Judgement. All too often 
expressions of taste are isolated, or amputated, from the wider 
concerns from which they gather sense. And it is little wonder 
that the aesthetic judgement, sometimes artificially forced into 
the mould of simple appraisal (having to do with ranking objects 
according to their appeal), appears mysterious, without origins or 
geneaology, and without the support that attends the majority of 
matter-of-fact judgements, such as that the moon is not made of 
green cheese. Indeed, the comparison with belief is instructive. 
As mentioned in the first chapter (pp. 15/16), a sceptical question 
may arise regarding individual beliefs, namely, how can they be 
justified. % e n  Inspected in isolation a belief frequently seems 
well-nigh unfounded. For example, if the car does not start, on a 
rainy morning why do I conclude that the spark-plugs, or one of a 
limited set of other possibilities, are to blame? Might it not be 
that the engine has been stolen since last I used the car, or that 
the laws of nature governing the combustion of petrol have, 
overnight, undergone a radical change? Why don't I consider these
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possibilities? Is it that I am imimaginitive, or too lazy to 
consider the full range of possibilities, or too stupid? For 
surely I cannot be certain that these hypotheses are wrong. (Even 
the argument that probably the laws of nature are the same as the 
day before is Insufficient to Justify ray convictions, if Hume's 
arguments on the subject are to be credited.) The familiar 
manoeuvre against such ideas is to point out that we do not hold 
beliefs singly, nor do we acquire or corroborate them singly. We 
believe a host of things, and it is within a vast framework of 
beliefs that we operate. Likewise, an aesthetic judgement has its 
place within a vast network of judgements and beliefs. Ik derives 
support from everything else within this structure. An aesthetic 
judgement, like a belief, implicates other judgements and rests 
upon, is supported by, other Judgements - and if one judgement is 
spurious, in the sense that it is not governed by conditions, then 
all judgements of this sort must be counted as similarly spurious.
Barring the most general scepticism, then, is the doubt that 
there is nothing to say on the subject of how the will is to be 
aligned with regard to various objects met?
Take the wine-glass that I find displeasing. It is important 
to remember that I shall have to find words to articulate what I 
find displeasing about the glass. I shall have to counter the 
suggestion, for example, that the stem of the glass be related to 
the stem of a rose, the globe related to a dew-drop, and so on. 
These images may not impress me. But I shall have to respond
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either with indifference - I have no opinion on these wine-glasses 
one way or the other - or with a negative view. I shall say: it's 
top-heavy, and if the stem were the stem of a rose it would droop 
or snap; it's over-decorated (in fact 'over-decorated' is not good 
enough - my companion might just deny this; it's necessary to 
suggest how much decoration is .appropriate. ..) ; the globe may have 
the shape and sparkle of a clear dew-drop but it is here overblown, 
bloated, fit to burst; and so on. (How are these views, these 
descriptions, these images, Interwoven - if 'interwoven* they are - 
with my feelings? Do these images and ray evaluation fit together 
only in the sense that for some strange reason^^ I simply happen to 
find these images attractive?)
It is significant that I could bring someone to see the glass 
as top-heavy. I might, for example, say that the glass ought to 
present a balanced feel, a look of effortless support, a sense of 
forces finely-balanced - all of these like a good throwing-knife, a 
ballerina, an eagle - and if I can bring these pictures to the 
forefront of his mind he may begin to see the imbalance of the 
glass. I can lend plausibility to these pictures rather than
others by talking about wine-glasses in a broad context; the glass 
should allow the colour of the wine to show clearly, allow, too, 
the smell of the wine to accompany the taste, and the contours of 
the glass ought to fit the hand comfortably, etc##. The force of 
the 'ought' in 'the glass ought to be finely-balanced like a good 
throwing-knife' derives from the plausibility of the idea that the 
glass is to be handled like an instrument and considered in the
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light of its weight, etc. The force of the 'ought' in 'the glass 
ought to allow the colour of the wine to show clearly' derives from 
the plausibility of the idea that wine-drinking involves the 
spectacle of wine itself, that a wine-glass ought to be shaped such 
as to bend light in a pleasing manner, lending the wine a sparkle, 
and so forth. If I can make out a good case for the images I 
favour - and making out a good case involves bringing to bear a 
comprehensive range of considerations, parallels with other cases 
(e.g., 'if you were buying cutlery you might pay attention, for 
reasons no less aesthetic than practical, to the feel of the knives 
and forks - so why not Judge wine-glasses by a similar 
criterion?'), analogies, and the like - I can bring my opponent to 
share my assessment, or if not share my assessment at least see the 
justice in it. The point is that if ray opponent begins to see the
glass in the way I suggest he can no longer find it pleasing.
(Consider seeing a line in a poem first .as an instance of irony and 
then as a crass blunder: a line which once pleased can please no
longer. Or consider seeing a way of life, e.g., stoical 
resignation, first as noble and then as foolish and base/immoral, 
e.g., ' I used to think the Christian idea of turning the other
cheek extremely cowardly and foolish, but I see now that it is an
expression of great courage and great wisdom...')
Thus, by various strategems^^ I can bring my companion to see 
the glass in terms that oblige him to see it as top-heavy. The 
ways in which my companion may combat my view are of course varied. 
He might say that, yes, the glasses are top-heavy, but, ..and go on
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to Introduce considerations which redeem top-heaviness, And, of 
course, he may match me image for image, thinking more in terms of
full-petalled roses and clear dew-drops than throwing-knives and
ballerinas. Whether one set of images is more apt than the other 
is an issue of wider scope. (Perhaps, as Peter .Kivy envisages, the 
dispute will come to rest on an ineradicable difference of opinion, 
a difference in the metaphors that each party to the dispute finds 
congenial.)
But an idea has been Introduced here that may seem to stand 
in need of elucidation, namely, the idea that a v/ay of seeing is 
connected, to an evaluation and that an evaluation can be influenced 
by a kind of suggestion, a presenting of persuasive images, a 
strategic presentation of metaphors, analogies, and parallels - in 
short a whole battery of devices that are not sanctioned l:y 
conventional logic. What sort of argument and what sort of proof 
have we here? What is the precise meaning of the .metaphors 
’bringing someone to see', 'bringing an image to the forefront of 
his mind', 'seeing the glass as a balance of forces, like a 
throwing-knife', .and the like? How are they related to evaluation? 
And where does this leave the rationality of aesthetics?
It is to this that I now turn.
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There are, it seems to me, two issues here. The first 
concerns the notion that a way of seeing is connected to, wedded 
to, an evaluation. The second concerns the notion that 'ways of 
seeing', hence evaluations, can.be influenced by various means (the 
'strategies' that I spoke of earlier). The first idea bears upon 
the sceptical view that perception of an object and an evaluation 
are separated by a gulf, bridgeable only by a pro-attitude, which 
is, unlike the perception, rationally ungoverned. The second idea 
bears upon the view that one evaluation is as good as another and 
that evaluations do not admit of rational appraisal or mutual 
modification. There is, to be sure, a relation between the views. 
If an alternative to the first idea proves supportable then there 
is scope for .a better account of reason-giving in aesthetics: if an 
evaluation is logically related to a certain conception of an 
object - which is accessible via reasons (via metaphors, Images, 
analogies, instructive parallels, and so on) - then an evaluation, 
too, is accessible.
The idea that there is a way of seeing the world that is so 
to speak steeped in value figures in a paper by John McDowell^-. 
The view that McDowell argues against is one most familiar from 
moral philosophy, but is nonetheless relevant to aesthetics. For 
that to which he is opposed is a view about what is required in 
order for the will to be disposed one way rather than another. It 
is the view that - and here I use terms culled from McDowell's
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presentation of the issue - motivation arises from a pro-attitude 
(a desire) that exists over and above a state of the cognitive 
apparatus of the agent. It is McDowell's contention that, on the 
contrary, it is often sufficient, to render an agent's motivation 
intelligible, to advert to his conception of how things are: 
motivation arises directly from (McDowell says 'flows from') the 
agent's special conception of his circumstances; no desire need be 
introduced to supplement the agent's conception. Says McDowell : 
"CTlhe agent's conception of the situation, properly understood, 
suffices to show us the favourable light in which his action 
appeared to him, " (p.16). McDowell argues, in effect, that
evaluation, the disposition of the will, is a cognitive state, a 
state of the cognitive equipment (or, at any rate, it figures in 
the logic of psychological descriptions as a cognitive state). 
Value, on this account, is not an ingredient in addition to a 
conception of an object. There are not two Independently
accessible data here, the evaluation on the one hand and the
(value-neutral) .conception of the object on the other. The
counterpart in aesthetics of the view to which McDowell is opposed 
is of course the view, featured in the last section, that .an 
aesthetic judgement involves a state of the will quite apart from, 
i.e., over and above, a state of the cognitive equipment, That is 
the view that what is really at issue is a disposition to value 
objects, and that this is quite independent from the way in which 
objects are described' '^-’.
105.
McDowell's argument trades upon the fact that desires are 
attributed to agents as part of the enterprise of rendering their 
actions intelligible (showing how the action appeared to them in a 
favourable light) only in certain circumstances. Often we 
attribute a desire to someone on the grounds that they are in fact 
motivated in a certain way - but the desire in such cases does not 
add anything to the specification, of or explanation of the action. 
Says McDowell: "If we credit him [the agent] with a suitable
desire, then...that need be no more than a consequence of the fact 
that we take his conception of the circumstances to have been his 
reason for acting as he did; the desire need not function as an 
independent component in the explanation, needed in order to 
account for the capacity of the cited reason to influence the 
agent's will." However, the idea that a desire is required in 
order to bring about a certain disposition of the will may prove 
tenacious, Such insistence upon there being a desire is. says 
McDowell, merely a prejudice; it is not. warranted either by ^hs 
phenomenology (pp. 18/19) or by the logical criteria that enter 
into ascriptions of motives .and reasons (pp, 14-17). The idea that 
a desire is always necessary in the explanation of action no doubt 
arises, says McDowell, from the idea that the world as it Is in 
itself is 'motivationally Inert'. But, says McDowell, the idea of 
the world as motivationally inert is "not an independent bard 
datum". It. is, he says, "simply the metaphysical counterpart of 
the thesis that states of will and cognitive states are distinct 
existences; which is exactly what is in question" (p. 19).
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Both the idea that states of will and cognitive states are 
distinct existences and the metaphysical counterpart to this idea - 
that the world as it is in itself is value-neutral or 
motivationally inert - have been considered in the first chapter. 
However, the following comments may shed a little more light on 
these issues.
Often, in aesthetic discussions,, we say: 'grasp this and you
shall see what I mean; look at it like this and the merits will 
become a p p a r e n t ' H o w e v e r ,  it would be mistaken to think that we 
look in a certain way first and then see the iserit, or that seeing 
the merit is consequent upon grasping something else. In a sense, - 
to be clarified - to see the merit and to look in a certain way Is 
one and the same achievement. % e n  someone sees the merit- they are 
sure to be looking in the requisite way, and vice versa. The case 
is like that in which the pupil learns to go on expanding a series 
of numbers. We say that the pupil has grasped the principle when 
he can continue;, the pupil's ability to continue in the requisite 
manner is the criterion of his having grasped the principle. For 
by the argument of chapter two, section II (pp. 65-67), the pupil's 
ability to go on is his having grasped, the principle. The one is 
not consequent upon the other. Being able to go on, or having 
grasped the principle, are not different items. By the same token, 
the criterion of someone's having perceived the merits of an object 
- i.e., the criterion of someone's understanding of an object - is 
what he says and does. If someone perceives an object as having 
the same merits that we perceive it as having then they must share
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our conception of it, Ve can tell if someone has grasped our
meaning by attending to how they go on to treat the object, how
they express their view, and so on. On this view there can be no 
separation between the way in which an object is described - i.e., 
how it Is treated and characterized (fine shades of behaviour come 
into the picture here) - and the way in which it is evaluated. The 
evaluation is expressed through what is said and what is done; it 
does not lie behind it. Comments earlier in this chapter, about 
the actions we suppose appropriate to a stated evaluation, are 
relevant here.
Perhaps the attempt to bring someone to share your conception 
of an object may compared \rlth the attempt to teach someone the 
meaning of an arithmetical operator. Assume that the pupil already 
has a practical knowledge of a number of arithmetical functions. 
By various examples we attempt to impart the meaning of our
operator. Likewise, we attempt to impart the sense of our
aesthetic view. But isn't there this disanalogy: in the
arithmetical case we are imparting a technique, a neutral item of 
information. But in the aesthetic case we are attempting to
influence evaluation, we are attempting to elicit agreement, 
approval, a similar emotive response. Or is there only apparent 
disanalogy? In the aesthetic case we are imagining, I suppose, 
resistance of some sort, a certain stubbornness, a reluctance to
comply: our pupil is pitting his evaluation against ours and, like 
the proverbial horse, though, perhaps, led to the water he cannot 
be forced to drink, Consider, however, attempting to teach someone
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a new method of subtraction, or a new method of long-division. 
Might there not be some resistance here too? And is the nature of 
the resistance so terribly different? How do we convince someone 
that they ought, rationally, to adopt our method of dividing or of 
subtracting? We could begin by showing that it agreed with theirs 
in the answers that it gave. But then we should have to argue 
that, despite the effort involved in changing from one system to 
another, the new system is worth the bother, because it is simpler, 
faster, more accurate (more user-friendly), and so forth. Ve might 
render the new technique more attractive by relating it to other 
mathematical techniques, and so on. It seems to me that this is 
not so far from the case where we attempt to convince someone that, 
a poem is ironic, or that .a novel, which they are inclined to 
dislike, is really worth reading. The nature of the resistance Is, 
I think, the same in each case. And the arguments put forward are, 
in each case, very similar. But perhaps, though, there are
differences elsewhere.
Ve could say, then, that, an evaluation drags along with it, 
so to speak, a certain conception of the object. The evaluation is 
bound up with certain ways of looking, with .an attention to this 
feature rather than that, with dispositions to use, in argument or 
in description of the object, this analogy rather than that, this 
image rather than that, and so on. The point is: how do we
discover what someone's conception is? The answer is that we look 
at what they say and do - for what they say and do is a criterion
of how they conceive of a thing. There is no independent mode of
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access to an evaluation apart from these details of behaviour. We 
frequently imagine, however, that we detect two things: on the one 
hand a perception of the object and on the other an attitude 
towards the object. And when we cannot see how the attitude is 
related to a (notional) value-free perception of the object we 
iiaagine the attitude to float free of the object. But whence comes 
the idea that there are two things here?
So the evaluation and the conception of the object are 
inseparable - this is a logical point. But doesn't this merely
shift the emphasis of the scepticism? Isn't it mincing words to
talk of the conception and the evaluation being inseparable? If 
they are inseparable then scepticism may be expressed about whether 
any conception of an object is better than another and whether It 
is possible to discuss rationally different conceptions.
The first point to be made here is that there can be no
absolute judge qf whether one conception is to be preferred to 
another. Therefore, the authority to be sought is not the 
authority of a definitive view of things. The second point is that 
our ways of conceiving of things are malleable. It is easy to 
maintain that an emotion drifts free of reasons/rational 
constraints. And it is easy to maintain that nothing - save
perhaps certain contingencies of nature - secures emotional 
responses. But it is less easy to maintain that a conception of an 
abject, which we express by means of certain metaphors, 
descriptions, evaluations, and the like, is not open to rational
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appraisal, particularly if by 'rational appraisal' we mean a 
process by means of which a conception may be overhauled, re­
located (in a larger conception of things), supported, 
consolidated, and so on. Such a process is undoubtedly a form of 
appraisal; it is rational Just in so far as it proceeds along rails 
laid down by a community, by rules sanctioned and recognized by a 
community, and in a manner recognized as valid by members of a 
community. Rational appraisal of .anything, from mathematical 
theorems to ideas of science, may be described as Just such a 
process. . . (Our entire way of seeing, that is our whole v/ay of 
proceeding, our grasp of the sense of our activities, the system of 
representations that we make for ourselves, is forever subject to 
influence and modification. Often, the paradigm case of conceptual 
change is taken to be the adoption or rejection of a belief, i.e.. 
an empirically testable proposition. But there are other forms of 
conceptual change - think, for example, of coming to see the sense 
of a particular moral outlook, such that it begins to exert an 
influence and .to make claims that, increasingly, call for 
recognition. Or think of coming to see (understand) the relation 
between different areas of mathematics, e.g., between integral and 
differential calculus. Are these changes best characterized as 
changes in belief? My understanding is certainly different - t can 
do now what before I could not do. But is this difference due to a 
new belief? (The idea of non-proposltional knowledge holds forth 
the possibility of rationality in aesthetics, since the ways in 
which such knowledge may be gained, and shaped, and communicated, 
may correspond to procedures found in aesthetics. If it is allowed
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that a shift in a point of view may be a part of rationality - some 
shifts are better than others, more complete, and for better 
reasons, etc - then aesthetics, which involves so many such shifts, 
may be brought into the fold of rational activities. See the 
following paragraphs on this.))
, Ve might say that an object licenses an 
interpretation/evaluation. Whether an interpretation is licensed 
by the object will be determined by whether members of a community 
can see the justice in the interpretation. That is, they may not 
agree with the interpretation but they recognize its claims to 
validity. An object may license many interpretations, like a 
figure that may be seen as many things, but some will be more 
defensible than others, which is to say that they will be mors 
easily construed by members of a community as one rather than the 
other. Herein lies the basis of the rationality of aesthetics, as 
well as an account of what grounds reasons in aesthetics, and how 
changes In aesthetic outlook are brought about.
But the question may now arise; ho'w is a world-view, or a 
system of values, established? How do we come by our values In the 
first place? The preceeding discussion has relied upon there being 
a more or less common pool of values - but what guarantees this? 
Is the basis for agreement biological? How could it be anything 
else? For the idea that values could be taught seems somewhat 
strange. How in such a case could consent be gained for the values 
of the community? These questions bear, of course, on the issue of
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bow one person gains the consent of another to his point of view, 
how value-systeiDS can be altered, fundamentally changed, tinkered 
with, tilted slightly to this side or that. This is the question 
that, at this stage, most troubles the sceptic; how do reasons work 
in aesthetics? How can we marshal, by rational means, a point of 
view, an emotional response?. The answer is that emotional 
responses, being tied up with beliefs and non~propositional points- 
of-view, are malleable just to the extent that beliefs and points- 
of-viaw are malleable. The emotive response to an object is not 
inaccessible - it finds expression in certain metaphors, 
Inclinations, etc - and these can be realigned, tampered with, 
overhauled, in short Influenced in a hundred ways. How, then, is 
someone brought to share the world-view of a community? How are we 
brought to value things (for it is a strange fact that people of 
the same culture are unanimous in holding certain values, say of 
propriety or of what is fashionable...>7 How is it that a 
disposition of the will can be grabbed hold of and given .a 
particular direction? Is it all psychological trickery?
Surely the world-view (and by 'world-view* I mean .a 
conception of the world that is steeped in value, a conception that 
is expressed In the disposition to value in certain ways) is 
absorbed throughout childhood in the way that, for example, 
etiquette and manners are absorbed. Although we can put aside the 
manners that we are taught as children we nonetheless carry with us 
a sense of propriety that derives from our early environment. We 
learn (good) behaviour already charged with value, we learn it
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along with expressions of approval or disapproval, it is woven into 
a context of value. Of course we can accept that other peoples go 
about things differently, and we do not necessarily suppose our own 
customs to be superior to all others, but we nevertheless find our 
own traditions more congenial than others (it is no objection to 
this to point to those who react against the customs abroad in 
their own social milieu - sometimes such people believe that they 
perceive the spirit of their customs not in their own society but 
in another society. Thus might someone say that the spirit of 
British fair play no longer survives in Britain but is to be 
observed more clearly amongst certain other nations or groups of 
people.). The world-view is imbibed from an early age. It Is not 
argued for, it is not imposed, it is not grafted onto a value- 
neutral view of the world. It is introduced as a first framework, 
complete with value. (Think of the practice of using money. The 
idea of money - how it is used - is not communicated apart from a 
conception of the value of money. %a t  money is worth, the place 
that it should occupy in life - rather than just what money can 
obtain for you - is learned along with the institution itself. We
could, for example, imagine someone writing, in an autobiography,
something along the following lines: 'I first became aware of money 
as something that could cause great rows in the household and as .a 
commodity which had associated with it .all sorts of dangers -and 
responsibilities, , . ' And is this not a fairly good description of 
what money means for us - even if it is not the first definition of 
money that springs to mind?) Ve may obtain an insight into bow
values are imparted by looking at an activity wholly concerned with
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the inculcation of a specific way of living and behaving. Such .an 
insight is afforded by the activity of religious instruction.
The religious teacher (in the sense of the guru rather than 
the possibly secular religious education teacher) practices a 
consistent (and constant) influence on the thoughts of the student. 
He is always there to offer the religious perspective. He says: 
look at the circumstance like this; here is the way in which it 
should be viewed; the response should be this...; etc. And, by and 
by, the student grasps the sense of the religious view. He 'gets 
the hang of it'. (Little by little his spiritual centre-of-gravity 
shifts - he pours himself, amobea-lifce, from one stance into 
another.) (Although the student may be relied upon to proceed 
correctly for the most part, he requires occasional topping up. 
Consider the role of religious teachers In most societies: they
expose the populace to religious ideas on a regular basis, and seek 
to impart a sense of value that will correct any false conceptions. 
For this reason, it is a mistake to think of religious teachers as 
preaching to the converted, or of congregations as self-reinforcing 
groups telling one another what they already know and want to hear. 
Rather, they receive a regular infusion of new blood, a challenge 
to faith - for they may not have grasped central ideas correctly - 
thus worship and instruction ought to be a testing, a challenge, 
not a complacent activity.) But what, does 'getting the hang of it' 
involve? Once again the central passages of the Investigations are 
relevant. The discussion there concerns, in part, what it is to 
get the hang of a rule, e.g., the rule governing the expansion of
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'+2'. Wittgenstein's conclusion may be said to be that 'getting 
the hang' of a rule is none other than being able to perform the 
requisite operations or actions. Getting the hang of the operation 
'+2', for example, Is not a question of grasping something elsa, 
upon which the grasp of the meaning of '+2' depends. The ability 
to go on after a certain process of training or instruction is, so 
Wittgenstein might have said, the given. It is basic and 
unanalysable.
So, when we grasp the new perspective we come to see the 
world in certain terms. It is useful here to think of learning 
certain skills - think of learning the meaning of a religious 
concept, e.g., the Christian concept of mercy, or humility, or 
forgiveness. We are taught over a long period, by means of 
countless examples, what these concepts mean, i.e., how they are 
deployed in life. We come to cut the world at certain joints, that 
is, we come to classify things in a distinctive manner as a matter 
of course, without going through an elaborate procedure of 
interpretation. . .Instances of shifting stance abound. When, as 
children, we cease to view our parents as the centre of the 
universe we change stance (we do not necessarily place our parents 
at the centre because of empirical beliefs - they simply occupy 
this position on faith). When, at various times in life, we cast 
ourselves in different roles, formulate different self-images..,we 
are all the time adopting different perspectives, which alter the 
way in which we behave.
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How are these considerations related to aesthetics? I am 
born into a culture, which is to say a distinctive way of looking 
at the world. I absorb this way of looking in countless small 
ways; I am steeped in a way of looking at the world from an early 
age, I learn emotional responses along with this way of seeing 
(that I exhibit the correct emotional responses is part and parcel 
of having mastered the distinctive way of seeing). The way in 
which I absorb an aesthetic outlook is like the way in which I 
might absorb a certain moral outlook, e.g., Christianity.
There is, then, as much scope in aesthetics for argument, for 
person-to-person communication and reciprocal Influence, as in any 
other activity. Herein lies the rationality of aesthetics.
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Conclusion.
In conclusion a few loose ends may be tied up. One
outstanding doubt may have to do with the fact that little has been 
said about the nature of the rationality involved in aesthetics. A 
question might arise, therefore, along the following lines; How is 
the case where someone is brought to view an object differently by 
what I have called psychological trickery (as a limiting case we 
might take hypnotic suggestion) to be distinguished from the case 
where someone has good reason to adopt a different point of view? 
In other words, what, on this account, constitutes a good reason? 
Vhere is the line to be drawn between presenting persuasive
metaphors, analogies, parallels, images, and the like - which I 
have said (pp. 102/103) is to be counted a rational procedure - and 
presenting an attractive but ultimately inadmissible case? After 
all, might they not alter their views in the way that we want but 
for the \frong reasons, e.g., because they admire, and wish to 
emulate, us?
An answer to this question may be approached via the example 
of the student mathematician. What leads us to call the method or 
process by which the student comes to proceed differently rational? 
Or, when we teach anyone a new technique, what leads us to call 
their progress rational? Isn't it just that their coming to 
proceed in the way required is a mark of rationality - they have
acquired mastery of a rational procedure? The question of how they
arrived at their mastery of the technique is not to the point;
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whether they relate the new technique to techniques that they know 
already, or whether they visualize outlandish things, or whether 
they go through a process unfathomable to us, the conclusion is the 
same, namely, that they have followed a rational procedure. For 
the only way in which a procedure can be counted non-ratlonal is if 
it does not deliver the goods, if it leads to an inability to go on 
in the requisite manner. (And even here we can imagine errors that 
look to be the resut of rational procedures and errors that defy 
analysis,)
Transferring this conclusion to the aesthetic case, we arrive 
at the view that someone changes their evaluation on ratlonally- 
defensible grounds if they can give a proper account of the 
aesthetic view to which they have been converted. If they cannot 
then they have grasped the wrong end of the stick, have adopted a 
view that they do not understand. Thus, if someone cultivates 
(perhaps it is more correct to say ’affects') a liking for a 
particular poet,, say, because someone whom they admire and wish to 
emulate likes the poet than we can say that they will not be able 
to replicate the understanding manifested by the person whom they 
admire. They do not arrive at an appreciation of the poet through 
the wrong avenues - rather, they do not arrive at an appreciation 
of the poet at all. Likewise, he who is induced, hypnotically, to 
like a certain poet will in all likelihood not be able to give 
adequate reasons for his enthusiasm. (There could be difficulties 
here, since people will often rationalize those things that, due to 
hypnotism, they are obliged to do. Thus, someone who has been
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directed to open a window will explain their actions by saying that 
the room is stuffy, and so on. The question is whether someone who 
rationalizes a liking for something can give a good account of 
their reasons for liking it. I suspect that in such a case we 
should think someone's reasons somewhat spurious.or ill-considered 
- as we might when, in the case of the window, someone says, 
against all evidence, that a cool, airy room is stuffy and needs 
ventilation.,.) On this view the end-product of aesthetic 
instruction/discussion is not to be described as a liking for this
or that feature of the world or of an object - it is a conception
of the world or of an object, such that it cannot be imparted by 
the wrong means - its being imparted is everything. (See, in this 
connection, John McDowell's arguments in "virtue and Reason", The 
Monist, 62, Mo. 3).
Another question that might be raised is how the idea of
shared responses (responses that everyone could share in theory if 
not in practice)' lends aesthetics more objectivity or rationality. 
Surely sheer weight of numbers cannot secure rationality? Whether 
one person or a community of people exhibits a certain response 
makes no difference to the non-cognitive nature of the response. 
Here, in reply, It might be appropriate to ask in return what, 
other than the actual responses of people, might secure the 
rational. Isn't what is rational and, irrational determined by the 
standards of a community? The very idea of rationality, or
objectivity, is tied to human agreement, for human agreement it is 
that decides what is rational and what is not, what is objective
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and what is not. The later work of Wittgenstein, which has 
featured in places in this essay, is relevant here. The question: 
how does shifting the emphasis of the discussion from the response 
of the individual to the response of a community help to secure the 
rationality and/or objectivity of aesthetics? could be read as 
seeking a justification of those procedures that the entire 
community recognizes as valid. However, an idea that is familiar 
from the work of Wittgenstein is that the practices of the 
community cannot be given an external justification - nor do they 
require one. They cannot be given a justification since we could 
just as well inquire what sanctions our acceptance of any such 
justification. When can we be sure that we have an ultimate 
justification? That is to say that anything that might pass muster 
as a justification of our ways of proceeding must Itself be
subjected to our standards of validity, and it is these that are in 
question. The practices of the community do not require a 
justification because they stand as what is given. Their
'justification' Is that they work, which is to say that they do not
jar with, corns into conflict with, the rest of our activities. Our
practices do not aim to reflect a super-sensible, or absolute, 
reality. Our practices simply are. Says Wittgenstein: "What has 
to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life.'* 
iPhilosophical Investigations, p.226).
As for the scraps of common wisdom with which, in chapter 
one, I started: often the effect of these statements is to
foreclose upon aesthetic discussion, to kill off argument and
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thought, to suggest that nothing is gained by studying aesthetic 
objects. The appreciation of aesthetic objects becomes a 
sollpsistic activity, Aesthetic discussion emerges, at best, as a 
sort of experience-sharing, like the disclosure of childhood 
memories that others might recognize but cannot share. However, I 
hope to have shown that some of the views that inform these ideas 
are questionable, and that aesthetic discussion, far from being a 
statement, simply, of likes and dislikes, is a reasonable activity, 
senstive to all sorts of considerations. Consequently, I hope, 
too, that in the course of the essay some idea has emerged of why 
aesthetic discussion is worthwhile. It is undoubtedly true that 
aesthetics does not allow proof of the sort found in mathematics - 
but herein lies its interest. It is open-ended, always amenable to 
alteration, extension, interpretation. And while this is sometimes 
true also of areas of science (for in science there can be 
discovery, interpretation of data, extension of theory, and so 
forth) the possibility of synthesis, of fresh discovery, increased 
understanding, and the like, is the greater in a conceptual 
activity such as aesthetics. Scientific inquiry may allow us to 
better manipulate our material environment, but just because 
aesthetics (or, indeed, any conceptual inquiry) does not deliver 
these tangible examples of progress does not mean to say that it is 
not worthwhile or is not profitably engaged in.
122.
Footnotes.
1. This sounds rather mild, as though the only response to 
scepticism of this sort is to throw up the hands in horror, and to 
appeal to the sceptic to do the same. But the point is a little 
sharper than that. It is that a far-reaching scepticism may 
ultimately cease to make sense, and may prove to be self-refuting.
2. I wouldn't want to say here whether in the end all these views 
ought to be dismissed as expressions of one metaphysical prejudice, 
or whether to advert to one view in support of another could ever 
be other than question-begging. However, the fact that the 
argument from queerness (of which more later) can be rendered in 
ontological and epistemological versions suggests that one 
metaphysical view unites these issues.
3. Says Hume: "Euclid has fully explained all the qualities of the 
circle; but has not in any proposition said a word of its beauty. 
The reason is evident. The beauty is not a quality of the circle. 
It lies not in any part of the line, whose parts are equally 
distant from a common centre. It is only the effect which that 
figure produces upon the mind, whose peculiar fabric of structure 
renders it susceptible of such sentiments. In vain would you look 
for it in the circle, or seek it, either by your senses or by 
mathematical reasoning, in all the properties of that figure." (An 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals^ p.291/292.)
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4. On this view the judgement is isolated from any other factors 
that might be operative in the agent's motivational structure. The 
agent is pictured as having preferences all of which are insulated
from one another; there is no logical relation between an interest
in, say, Shakespeare and an interest in, say, Picasso or Jazz or
Citizen Kane or any other sphere of human life. (It is this that 
the metaphors of the needle-thin aesthetic agent and of the 
lighting-like aesthetic judgement are intended to convey. The 
aesthetic agent's judgements are pictured as having the selectivity 
and particularity of the sharp needle, which can probe a small area 
without disturbing anything round about. The lightning-like
judgement is, like lightning, not to be explained, and strikes 
apparently arbitrarily...) Thus, an interest in Shakespeare can 
appear to have no relation to any other interests, and so cannot be 
supported or challenged by reference to any other interests. Scope 
for rational manoeuvre is restricted. But I should argue, on the 
contrary, that the aesthetic judgement - to use an excellent phrase 
of David Wiggins' - 'fans out into a whole aborescence of 
concerns'. The judgement is answerable to these concerns and these 
concerns provide a foothold for argument. This idea is prominent 
in the second and third chapters of this essay.
5. Compare the following comments by Basil Ashmore on the subject 
of Beethoven and his critics: "While 19th Century writers tended to 
grow moist-eyed over Beethoven's misfortunes and refused to paint 
him 'warts and all', many 20th Century commentators have reacted so 
strongly to the warts that one wonders how a man whom Ernest Newman
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described as being merely 'arrogant, boorish, unethical, 
unspiritual and undignified' could possibly have created some of 
the noblest art of all time! " Of course, the point is blunted 
somewhat if the critic regards the music as consonant with the 
character of the composer.
6. Though, to be sure, even these have, like moral philosophy, 
sometimes sought to adopt a 'scientific approach', to introduce 
impartiality, and to refrain from making specific value-judgements.
(This is not to say, though, that such scholarship should aim to 
endorse what John McDowell has criticized as 'the mildly comical 
idea that the subject-matter of aesthetics is a set of judgements 
in which objects are explicitly appraised, ranked, or evaluated' .
Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World, p. 2.)
7. It might seem that the existence of what might be called |
'culinary arts' - wine-tasting, haute cuisine, and the like - |
Iconstitutes an objection of sorts here. But it must be remembered |I
that the food-critic does not aspire to the objectivity sought by j
art criticism: argument is exhausted far quicker and conviction run I
less deep. Also, there is not the close-knit fabric of reasons and |
counter-reasons that characterize important aesthetic disputes. |
8. There is no contradiction here. There are, after all, no areas |i
of inquiry that do not suffer theoretical revolutions. The '
possibility of a complete upheaval is no more proof of the
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subjectivity of aesthetic judgement than it is proof of the 
subjectivity of science.
9. It is worth distinguishing here between two senses of 
objective. The first implies real existence, and is opposed to 
what is subjective in the sense of fictive, imaginary, illusory,
The second implies non-subjectivity, i.e., without subject, which 
is opposed to what is subjective in the sense of subject-dependent.
Thus a headache may be objective in the first sense - it is not 
illusory - but not objective in the second sense - it depends for 
its existence upon a subject, (I owe this point to J. Haldane.) 1
In the text I mean 'objective' in the second sense. The case that j
ja certain kind of non-cognitivisra tries to drive home is that what |
Iis real is to be equated with what is objective in the second 1
!sense, i.e., what is independent of any subject. I argue, along Jt
with Nagel, McDowell, Wiggins et al., that this conflation is a |
!mistake.
10. See John McDowell, Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the 
Fabric of the World, in Schaper (Ed), Pleasure, Preference, and 
Value.
11. It might be objected here that this is only a picture, and 
that what is important is the law that holds between volume and 
pressure. However, although it is to the point in some 
circumstances to give this ratio as an explanation it is really the 
law that stands in need of explanation. The interesting question
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is; what accounts for this mathematical relationship between 
pressure and volume?
12. It might be said that these are simply popular expressions 
brought into use in order to characterize, crudely, complex 
mathematical discoveries. Thus scientists invent humourous names 
for mathematical constant entering into sub-atomic physics -
strangeness, charm, and the rest. But: if the mathematics has no
empirical content it is just mathematics. It explains nothing and
does not connect with the world at all. The attempt to envisage
the meaning of a mathematical science is the attempt to understand 
the rationale behind a predictive technique.
13. The following illustration may make this point clearer. It is 
reasonable to suppose that the character of the music composed for 
different instruments can differ according to the instrument. The 
form of the instrument will dictate certain aspects of the form of
the music. By this I mean not just superficial differences, such
as that the range of the piano extends two octaves either side of 
the range of the guitar; I mean that different instruments will 
present for exploration different musical possibilities. Imagine, 
for example, a keyboard instrument where all the natural notes are 
gathered together on one keyboard while the remaining notes are 
placed on a keyboard above (i.e., one keyboard contains all the 
white notes of the conventional piano and the other contains all 
the black notes). It is feasible that the music for this 
instrument will differ more or less subtly from music composed for
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the conventional piano. (In the same way, different methods of 
playing the piano may liberate the composer from certain 
restrictions.) And, through looking at the score, it may be 
posible to tell which instrument the music is scored for. The 
instrument may not exactly stamp the music with its unique seal, 
but it may lend the music a particular flavour. ..It is in such a 
way that I imagine the human perspective to influence the human 
account of the objective world.
14. And what can be meant by Interpretation other than a 
conception of the mathematics that ties it, if only metaphorically 
- as in the case of light-waves and sub-atomic particles - to the 
phenomena of everyday? Without Interpretation we have a successful 
theory but no clear idea of what it means far us. This state of 
affairs is what gives rise - as I think David Wiggins points out - 
to the confusion concerning what it is that a discovery in, say, 
high-energy physics has shown us, how it has advanced our 
knowledge...
15. The point here may be clarified if a comparison is made 
between events (causes and effects) and actions. I am suggesting 
that the identification of causes and effects, no less than the 
identification of actions, depends upon the exercise of human 
categories. The idea that an event may be characterized 
Independently of uniquely human ways of viewing the world is, it 
seems to me, no more sensible than the idea that an action may be 
correctly characterized independently of the place that the action
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has in human affairs - understood from the human point of view. 
For an interesting discussion of this issue in the philosophy of 
action see H.A. Prichard's Acting, Willing, Desiring and A.I. 
Melden's Willing (both in A.R. White (ed), The Philosophy of 
Action, O.U.P., Oxford, 1968).
16. For example, a house burns to the ground. If we take the 
cause as that without which the house , would not have burned it is 
not clear that we can confidently exclude anything. The fact that 
it didn't rain could be construed as a cause. Or the fact that the 
floor was dry, the rooms stacked with flammable material, the town 
fire-engines otherwise engaged. All else remaining the same,
virtually any circumstance can be construed as contributing to the 
house burning. If we take the cause to be that which necessitated 
the burning of the house we shall again be unable to exclude 
anything, since the cause is a complex of circumstances working 
together. No single circumstance alone can be identified as the 
cause. It is not implausible to suggest that the cause in any
particular case is identified as that which is out of the ordinary,
that which marks the situation as unusual. The cause of a' fire may
in one situation be attributed to the dropping of cigarette-ends 
(if, say, the fire is in a no-smoking area, e.g., a petrol-station) 
while in another situation it may be attributed to the presence of 
flammable material which cigarette-ends have ignited (if the fire 
is in a smoking area, e.g., a football stadium), The attribution 
of cause, then, varies according to the situation (just as the
attribution of moral responsibility varies).
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17. I say 'human life' but this Is of course a general
observation. The absolute conception of the world is a 
metaphysical ideal. Perhaps God conceives of the world in this
way. Certainly, we could never in that case conceive of a God-like
thought - it would mean nothing to us.
18. Ve can only be persuaded within life as it were. It is
incoherent to be persuaded by Internal concerns to adopt an 
external position that effectively denies the validity of the 
Internal concerns. The paradox is tangible.
19. Of course, I have not shown value to be objective in the sense
that it stands alongside - and may be investigated by the same
means as - physical phenomena, I hope, however, to have shown that 
the prima facie case against value, as presented by the objective 
conception of the world, is not conclusive, nor is the adaption of 
the objective view compulsory. The idea that only that which is 
without a subject may really exist should be held at arm's length - 
at least for the moment (thus the last sentence in the text reads: 
"The difficulty is to understand how this ' valiie-location' is to be 
achieved").
20. At least on some theories weakness of will is thought of as
the phenomenon of a desire overriding the deliverances of reason
21. Except, of course, in the sense that cognition may Inform the 
Intelligence of the existence of features of the world that are
130.
relevant to a particular desire, as, for example, the realization 
that a coconut may be smashed with a stone may arouse the desire 
for coconut milk.
22. Hume again; "'Tis obvious, that when we have a prospect of 
pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of 
aversion or propensity, and are carry*d to avoid or embrace what 
will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction" (Treatise, p.414),
23. It might be objected that to say that a motivation arises from 
a desire is not entirely non-explanatory. Perhaps the point in the 
text needs to be coupled with the observation that aesthetic 
discussions exhibit a fine rational structure and that this does 
not sit easily with the idea that it is only necessary to advert to 
an agent's desire in order to explain his interest in some 
aesthetic quality. Even if adverting to desires gives an 
explanation of sorts it does not allow an explanation of the 
subtlety of aesthetic discussion. (Imagine someone saying that a 
person's philosophical outlook may be explained by reference to his 
desires. Unless this statement is considerably elaborated it is 
woefully inadequate as an account of why someone holds the 
philosophical views that he does in fact hold.)
24. See Thomas Nagel's comments on prudence in The Possihllity of 
Altruism.
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25. - Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World, 
p. 1.
26. See G.E. Moore's Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33: "Ha said 
that such a statement as ' That bass moves too much* is not a 
statement about human beings at all, but is more like a piece of 
mathematics; and that, if I say of a face which I draw 'it smiles 
too much* , this says that it could be brought closer to some 
'ideal', not that it is not yet agreeable enough, and that to bring 
it closer to the 'ideal* in question would be more like 'solving a 
mathematical problem* . Similarly, he said, when a painter tries to 
Improve his picture he is not making a psychological experiment on 
himself, and that to say of a door * It is top-heavy* is to say what 
is wrong with it, not what impression it gives you. The question 
of Aesthetics, he said, was not 'Do you like this?* but 'Why do you 
like it?"'
27. Recall Wittgenstein's introduction to the Tractatus Lagico- 
Pilasophicus: "I therefore believe myself to have found, on all
essential points, the final solution of the problems. And if I am 
not mistaken in this belief then the second thing in which the 
value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved 
when these problems are solved."
28. I am aware that the idea of a 'correct* application of 
aesthetic concepts is not free of problems. Indeed, some may argue 
that aesthetic concepts, being intricately bound up with emotions,
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can only be used by beings susceptible to emotions, and that 
computers could not therefore use aesthetic concepts at all - at 
best they could only pretend to use them Cor, better, simulate the 
use of them). It is one of the aims of this section of the essay 
to show that aesthetic concepts can be correctly or incorrectly 
used...It seems to me that the following considerations are salient 
in this case: aesthetic discussions, however full of
disagreement/contention, are generally intelligible. That is to 
say that we follow the exchange of views, we understand the points 
of contention, and we can often say what the dispute hangs upon. 
It seems to me that this would be Impossible were there no rules 
governing the application of aesthetic concepts (or, as 
Wittgenstein said, a disagreement requires common ground, a 
substratum of agreement). An incorrect use of aesthetic concepts 
would take the discussion off the rails: there could be no
discussion.
29. Aesthetics: An Introduction, 0,U.P. 1987,
30. Even if this is a miscontrual of Sheppard's position the issue 
is still of Interest. For we can still ask; how can we argue about 
aesthetic judgements, how can we justify them, how can we bring 
others sometimes to see what we are driving at and at other times 
to agree with us, and so forth. I.e>, how can we account for the 
rationality of aesthetic discourse when we cannot pin down what the 
key concepts mean? Is the entire activity of aesthetic appraisal 
and discussion a fudge?
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31. That is to say that aesthetic concepts are governed not by 
necessary and sufficient conditions but by conditions which loosely 
entail the aesthetic concept, These ideas will be more fully 
treated In the main text.
32. This accounts for the dissatisfaction I have attributed to 
Anne Sheppard, Wittgenstein argues against that tendency of which 
Sheppard offers an example, the tendency to generalize, the 
tendency to capture phenomena in succint formulas - and he argues 
most forcefully against the philosophical superstitions that 
underlie this tendency.
33. Note that this, and the paragraphs Immediately following (to 
the top of p. 55), are largely exegetical, and serve not to argue 
for Wittgenstein's views, but to place those views in context 
relevant to the present discussion. Wittgenstein's arguments are 
put forward on pp. 55-66.
34. I am thinking here of an intention to create a certain effect, 
or to express a certain mood, or somesuch. Thus a poet may have 
the intention of capturing the significance of swans on a lake but 
not succeed in the attempt. How does he know he has not succeeded? 
Because, the argument runs, he feels the disparity between the 
inner perception and the public expression.
35. The phrase appears, in fact, at Investigations 546.
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36. I should say here that I am not presuming in what follows to 
give a summary of the grand scheme of the Investigations. I merely 
seek to bring to the fore the strand of argument therein that seems 
most suited to my (theoretical and exegetical) purposes.
37. This example is, of course, the same as Wittgenstein's at P. I.
151 and thereabouts. The variations on the game are designed to
bring out the parallels between the arithmetical case, the 
déterminâte-concept case, and the loose-concept case.
38. John McDowell, "Non-Cognitlvism and Rule-Following" in 
Wittgenstein: to Follow a Rule. Also, "Virtue and Reason" in the
Monist, 62, No.3.
39. I imagine, in fact, that it was such an idea that Wittgenstein
ws thinking when he talked about a note struck on the keyboard of
the imagination and about understanding language as being more like 
understanding music than is commonly supposed. These ideas, it 
should be noted, further decrease the distance between aesthetic 
phenomena and the phenomena that are usually placed in opposition 
to them.
40. "It is the mark of the educated man to look for precision in 
each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject 
admits". Sicoiaachean Ethics, I, 3.
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41, Ve could say that The Sun secures, or stands guard over, the 
sense of a certain distinction - that between biased reporting and 
relatively unbiased reporting. Perhaps it marks one stage along a 
continuum from what we call objective reporting, which news­
services presumably seek to exemplify, to what we call blatant 
propaganda. Thus, if someone asked if The Sun were an example of 
blatant propoganda we might deny that term, and produce an example 
of true propaganda, e.g., party-political broadcasts, the 
literature of fanatical pressure-groups, and the like. And we can, 
by means of many examples (the use of which Anne Sheppard 
deplored), illustrate the fine distinctions that we might wish to 
mark in this area. (Think, for example, of where on the continuum 
we might place: religous television broadcasts; BBC News reports; 
Nazi war-films; public-health advertisements; the philosophical 
works of Hume; the historical works of H.G. Wells; the literary 
criticism of a Marxist or Freudian thinker; etc.) The Sun occupies 
a fairly determinate and fixed position within the pantheon of 
exemplars here.>
42. This conclusion relates directly to the earlier comments on 
sense-experience, private language, and the queerness of aesthetic 
value. For there it was suggested that concepts did not derive 
directly from sense-experience as a matter of course or of logical 
deduction. It was suggested that our practice of applying concepts 
in a particular way was the only fact that secured the meaning of 
our concepts...Thus, the metaphysical prop taken away, it was
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possible to see how aesthetic concepts and sense-experience 
concepts (concepts in general) were related.
43. In fact this appears to be the sort of view that David Wiggins 
Inclines towards in Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life. For 
in a footnote to that essay Wiggins says: " I think
that...philosophers have misdescribed the undoubted fact that, 
because there is no standing interest, to which yellowness answers, 
'yellow' is not such as to be cut out (by virtue of standing what 
it stands for) to commend a thing or evaluate it favourably. But, 
surely, if there were such a standing interest, 'yellow' would be 
at least as well suited to commend as 'sharp' or 'beautiful' or 
even 'just' are." (p.107), The point here, it seems to me, is that 
'yellow' differs from such concepts as 'elegant' not because the 
one picks out features of the world while the other does not, but 
because 'yellow' is an indifferent term, because we are in general 
indifferent to yellowness, whereas we are not in general 
indifferent to elegance or to other aesthetic qualities - in these 
cases we have a 'standing interest' to which these concepts answer. 
The point of philosophical interest becomes on this view what the 
nature of this standing Interest is. (Note, incidentally, that the 
distinction between colour on the one hand and aesthetic value on 
the other is not that between the objective or non-relative and the 
subjective-involving or relative. Colour and value are alike in 
this respect (see ch. 1). They differ, however, in that the one 
but not the other is non-evaluative, is Independent of the will.)
137.
44, Note the phrase 'essentially unconstrained* . The non- 
cognitivist might argue that affective responses are intentional, 
Involving a conception of their object, and are therefore 
constrained In terms of intelligibility. It does not make sense, 
for example, to be terrified of a grain of sugar (unless, of 
course, there are circumstances under which a grain of sugar is 
lethal - perhaps to someone who has imbibed a substance which is 
fatal if combined with the slightest trace of sugar - but this is 
to bring in various supporting considerations). The non- 
cognitivist will argue, however, that the entire complex of 
attitudes that frame a particular affective response is cognitively 
unconstrained, hence essentially unconstrained. It is the
development of precisely this line of argument, and its 
implications, that this chapter is concerned with.
45. Suppose someone were to point to a part of the Tay Rail 
Bridge, e.g., criss-crossing metal struts between the legs of the
bridge, and suggest that these are elegant. Ve should first of all
consider whether there is any ground for saying that these are 
elegant - we might initially say that, yes, they are surprisingly 
delicate, and do lend a certain sinuousness to parts of the bridge, 
etc - and then we might begin the business of honing down this 
description. But in another context we should be more ready to 
challenge the ascription of elegance to an object - not because the 
object is even less likely than the Tay Rail Bridge to be elegant 
but because the object is more easily construed as elegant. In the
case of the bridge we are content merely to know how on earth the
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concept 'elegant' applies. But in the case of an object such as a 
wine-glass we are concerned to argue the finer points of meaning.
46. Similarly, someone who pronounces a set of wine-glasses 
elegant, and then proceeds to mistreat it, lock.it away from sight, 
attempt to pass it on to friends, is not applying 'elegant' 
correctly - their behaviour betrays, surely, that they mean 
something more like 'ugly' or 'crass' or somesuch.
47. It might be worth noting here that there is more to someone's 
grasping a concept than their using it in a way that we could 
endorse - or, rather, the ways in which they may use the concept 
correctly are quite numerous. For example, if someone calls the 
Tay Rail Bridge elegant, and sticks to this view, we shall want to 
see what sort of discussion they enter into: are they using the 
concept like an aesthetic concept, are they placing it within a 
context of argument that suits an aesthetic concept, and so on. We 
may not grasp what someone means by a concept but we may understand 
what kind of concept is being used. It is not only by applying a 
concept to an unexpected object that someone indicates their 
failure to understand - after all, someone could use a concept in 
an unorthodox way in order to make a point and highlight aspects of 
an issue usually overlooked.
48. But here we encounter the artificiality of the Issue. Is it 
plausible to suggest that we should be asked to identify the most 
elegant between the Golden Gate Bridge and a wine-glass? Are they
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commensurable? Ve can easily imagine the comparison between the 
Golden Gate and the Tay Rail Bridge. Ve should say something like: 
if I had to look at a bridge from my window every morning I should 
prefer it to be the Golden Gate rather than the Tay Rail Bridge. 
(And here, perhaps, is the cue for another issue: why are we
interested in the one bridge rather than the other? Is there any
reason why we should prefer one bridge to the other?) But would we
say: if I had to look at something over ray bowl of cereal I should 
prefer it to be a wine-glass rather than the Golden Gate? This, it 
seems to me, is a bit like asking which of an alligator or a whale 
is most like a spider - unless there's a riddle here there is no 
answer.
49. It is questionable, though, whether this prominence is not a 
distortion of the true state of affairs. Aesthetic discussions are 
seldom discussions of simple merit. Vs may think long and hard - 
and aesthetically - about an object without considering whether or 
not we like it. Our interest in an aesthetic object may be due to 
many different factors, and to say simply that I must like those 
objects that I find interesting for one reason or another is like 
saying that I do the things I do because I generally want to, or 
desire to do them. This is either false, or it is a truism. It
might seem a banal question to ask: do you like this sonnet of
Shakespeare's? 'Like' is not quite the word required here. Vhich 
is to say that the reasons behind someone's interest in or concern 
with a Shakespearean sonnet preclude the adequacy of 'like'. If 
someone says, for example, 'you like Philosophy, then?*, the answer
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'yes' is somewhat lame ~ if you 'like' Philosophy it is for a
reason - and the relation between Philosophy and your Interest in 
it is not captured by the relation described by 'like'.
50. The phrase derives from John McDowell, in Is Morality a
Sysytem of Hypothetical Imperatives? (PAS Supp. Vol. LII 1978, pp. 
13-29.)
51. It is Instructive to compare this case with the case of, say, 
a philosophical dispute. There the supposition tends to be that 
there is an answer to be had, that there is a final account - a
truth - of the matter. A philosophical dispute may remain
unresolved but this will be due to exhaustion or lack of time or 
loss of interest, etc. I.e., the impasse is due to sociological or 
psychological/practical factors, not logical factors. So whereas 
disagreement is rationally acceptable in an aesthetic dispute it is 
not so acceptable in a philosophical dispute.,.The dispute in 
aesthetics, hov/qver, is rationally acceptable only once the issue 
has been scrutinized and the best efforts have been made to 
reconcile opposing views.
52. I say 'some strange reason' here not to be disparaging but to 
indicate that the connection is supposed to be quite unfathomable. 
Perhaps there is a contingent psychological connection - at any 
rate the connection is not one mediated by reason.
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53. These seem questions of practical function, but they are 
related to the entire experience of wine-consumptlon; moreover, 
some of the arguments I will give will concentrate upon what is 
appropriate in the light of the function and nature of wine. Note, 
incidentally, that here is another example of. the way in which 
aesthetic disputes range over a large area and cannot be confined 
to a small compass.
54. The idea that various stratagems are used to change someone's 
point of view is reminiscent of the kind of philosophy that 
Wittgenstein claimed to practice. In philosophy, said 
Wittgenstein, there is no single method, but a variety of methods, 
reminders to a particular purpose, cures for particular ailments.
55. Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives? in PAS
supp. vol. LII 1978, pp. 13-29.
56. McDowell characterizes the general sceptical position thus;
A view of how things are is a state or disposition of one's 
cognitive equipment. But the psychological state we are
considering are to suffice, on their own, to show how certain
actions appeared in a favourable light. That requires that 
their possession entails a disposition of the possessor's 
will. And will and belief - the appetitive and the cognitive
- are distinct existences; so a state which presents itself
as cognitive but entails an appetitive state must be, after
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all, only Impurely cognitive, and contain the appetitive 
state as a part. If such a state strikes its possessor as 
cognitive, that is because he is projecting his states of 
will on to the world (a case of the mind's propensity to 
spread itself upon objects). The appetitive state should be 
capable in principle of being analysed out, leaving a 
neutrally cognitive residue,..(p.18).
57. See Wittgenstein's comments on this as recorded by G.E. Moore 
in Wittgenstein*s Lectures in 1930-33, in Mind 1955.
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APPEIBIX I.*
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* Note that Wittgenstein's rope-metaphor covers the same ground - 
this may be considered a diagramtical expression of the same idea. 
The concepts in the intelligence-clique are associated not in 
virtue of a bond that runs through all - they do not all overlap on* 
the same point - but through a pattern of overlappings - fibre on 
fibre, as Wittgenstein says.
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